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ABSTRACT
This thesis derived from increasing concerns over the future
development of Indian Reservations within the United States.
For the past century the federal government has created a
system of dependency for Indian people living on these re-
servations. This dependency has included education, health,
economic development, transportation, housing, social ser-
vices, etc., with the ultimate federal goal of assimilating
the Indian into the mainstream of the dominant American
life-style. In many situations the government has accom-
plished their goal. But for the most part Indian people
have survived these attempts by the government to absorb
them into an alien society. Consequently, reservations exist
with growing populations, expanding geographically and pos-
essing vast amounts of natural resources such as coal,
natural gas, oil and uranium. It is the development of these
natural resources that will be the most important challenge
to the Indian life-style since the coming of the first white
Europeans.
Today there is an increasing demand by Indian people for
self-determination and more control over their affairs. The
problem is how to accomplish this when Indian Tribes are
confronted with (1) the conflicts of gaining self-reliance
after 100 years of domination by a governing federal system
that it still does not understand, (2) the desire to indus-
trialize, yet compete in an economic system that has differ-
ent standards, and (3) the challenge of future development
without losing its social and cultural identity.
To better explain this problem, this thesis concentrates on
the Navajo Reservation, located in the Southwest United
States. The objective is to recommend to the Tribal govern-
ning body alternatives for increasing their control over
the future development of the reservation that would conse-
quently develop a process for implementing self-determina-
tion.
The approach of this thesis is to investigate existing exam-
ples where the Tribe has instituted internal control over
economic ventures and where external controlling factors have
prevented complete tribal participation. These illustrations
focus on the controlling factors of (1) management, (2) em-
ployment, and (3) marketing, required to implement a process
of self-determination.
These illustrations are presented as examples to the Tribal
Council to illustrate the Tribe's ability to creat their own
control over economic development ventures. The same princi-
ples of control are extended in the thesis to demonstrate on
a larger scale possible controlling alternatives that the
Tribal Council should consider in the future development of
their natural resources. This is accomplished by presenting
two illustrations concerning the development of coal in the
Four Corners Region of the reservation and proposed coal
gasification plants.
Each illustration is presented with its present characteris-
tics and further explores alternative controlling recommenda-
tions for the Tribe. In addition, the socioeconomic, cultural
and environmental impacts that coal development will have on
the reservation are presented, emphasizing the amount of
benefits, trade-offs and opportunities the Tribal Council
should consider before development policy and decisions are
made.
Finally the thesis concludes by emphasizing the fact that the
Navajo Tribe still owns and basically controls their (1) land,
(2) natural resources, and (3) water, three important factors
that help maintain the Navajos as a tribal entity. But to
maintain this identity, it will be necessary for the Tribal
Council to develop a more balanced growth strategy throughout
the reservation.
This strategy should integrate planning methods that will
help the Tribe in minimizing their land and water resources,
while maximizing the human resources and overall economic
goals, resulting in a process of self-determination.
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Associate Professor of Urban Design
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Associate Professor of Urban and
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INTRODUCTION
Each year the term "self-determination" becomes a stronger
reality for the American Indians living on reservations
located throughout the United States. After 100 years of
strict domination by the federal government, the Indian people
are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of regaining
self-control. Before 1860 the American Indians were, for the
most part, free to determine their own destiny. After this
date many agreements were signed between various Indian
tribes and the federal government, and these led the govern-
ment to form the reservations to "protect" the Indian people.
For approximately 100 years thereafter, these reservations
existed under the control of the federal government through
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the Department of the
Interior. On these reservations Indians were born, lived, and
died under dominance that was unknown to their ancestors. The
individuals born into this new system became very dependent
on the U.S. government, which had imposed upon them govern-
mental, educational, and health and employment systems that
were designed by the BIA. All were designed to assimilate the
Indian into the mainstream of the white American life style.
About 1960 the self-determination concept began to take root,
and the problem of implementing this concept has become a
main concern for many Indian tribes. Today, some reserva-
tions are better prepared than others politically or economi-
cally to cope with the demands of development. But, regard-
less of these prevailing conditions, there are three main
elements of concern that confront all Indian tribes in the
development process: (1) How does an Indian tribe gain self-
reliance after 100 years of domination by a governing system
that it still does not understand? (2) How does the Indian
tribe industrialize when it has to compete in an economic
system that has different standards? (3) Finally, how does
the Indian tribe join the 20th century without losing its
social and cultural identity?
Today more than half of the Indian population in the U.S.
lives on Indian reservations. Most of these reservations
have high unemployment, poor health facilities, and inadequate
transportation systems. Although they have an adequate labor
force, many reservations have ample natural resources that
have not been developed. These natural resources (coal,
uranium, oil, and lumber) are a primary concern to these
developing areas.
The social and economic problems on the reservations are
relatively easy to define. Also, goals and suggestions for
improving the situations often seem intuitive. But tribal
governments have not clearly developed the means for imple-
menting these goals or development strategies. Usually
these strategies are generated by the federal government
through the BIA or private sector concerns and do not repre-
sent the same goals or expectations of the Indian people.
In other words, the strategies do not answer the demands or
needs of the respective developing reservations.
For many of these Indian tribes, the lack of exposure to or
misunderstanding of planning models that come off the reser-
vation create issues in reservation development. For example,
the Navajo Tribe exists in a dual economy. The traditional
economy is based on subsistence farming, livestock raising,
rug weaving, handicrafts. There is also a cash economy
where an individual or the tribe as a whole are monetarily
rewarded by their labor, sale of products, or development of
natural resources. In most cases, the tribal decisionmakers
and policymakers are individuals who understand clearly and
agree with one of these two economies. But, also, there are
individuals at this level who understand both and are in
conflict because of their traditional Indian ideology, on
the one hand, and their desire to see the reservation develop
in the most equitable way for all members of the tribe. Con-
sequently, Indian tribal governments have difficulties in
developing consistent planning strategies and implementing
development policies for their reservation.
As mentioned earlier, Indian tribes have for generations
depended on the U.S. federal system for their livelihood.
But in December 1975, the Nixon Administration signed into
law a bill approved by the U.S. Congress, titled Public Law
93-638, The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assis-
tance Act. This law essentially permitted Indian tribes to
contract and administer directly federal programs that had
previously been administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
or the Indian Health Service. This law essentially enforced
the belief of many tribal leaders that they in fact did have
the right and ability to determine the destiny of their
reservation and its people.
With this emphasis on Indian self-determination, many tribes
are entering an era of reservation development that is
increasing the complexities of attempts to maintain their
cultural heritage and yet to alleviate some of the economic
disparity that exists between reservations and other commun-
ities throughout the United States. One approach that tribes
are taking to change the economic standard on the reservation
is through development of their natural resources.
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the approach
the Navajo Tribe is taking in developing their coal resources.
Because this development will have far-reaching implications
on the Navajo culture, economy, and environment, it is
imperative to have a process for tribal decisionmakers that
allows them the opportunity to investigate development pro-
posals and be aware of the comprehensive implications that
might occur. The thesis will investigate the problems con-
fronting the Navajo Tribe in the development of the coal
resources and provide recommendations for the integration of
this reservation development process into the Tribe's goals
of self-determination.
Chapter I will present a brief profile of the Navajo reser-
vation's characteristics, define the Tribe's development
goals as established in their 10-year plan by the Office of
Navajo Economic Development, and show the relationship
between these goals and the process of self-determination.
Chapter II will present two case studies, one on the devel-
opment of coal strip mining in the Four Corners region of
the reservation and the second on the proposed coal gasifi-
cation plants in the same region. The studies will provide
a profile of each case and its effects on reservation devel-
opment. In addition, recommendations will be provided for
developing alternatives for tribal planners to gain more
control over this form of economic development, and thus
relate to the self-determination process.
Chapter III will discuss the implications that strip mining
and coal gasification will have on the reservation and Tribe
in the areas of water resources, land reclamation, and new
town development.
Chapter IV will conclude the thesis by summarizing the pre-
vious chapters and recommending methods for improving reser-
vation development through a process of self-determination.
CHAPTER I
NAVAJO DEVELOPMENT GOALS
"For over 100 years it has been the policy of
the U.S. government to assist the American
Indian to become economically self-sufficient.
In a large measure... this policy has been a
failure... It has never occurred to the majority
of those pronouncing this policy that many
Indians may not want to swim in a mainstream
they largely regard as polluted and that they
should be free to refuse; or that there might
exist an Indian culture, which not only rejects
the materialistic value system of the White Man,
but has positive values in terms of brotherhood,
and preservation of one's environment, from
which the White Man could learn, if he were
willing to listen."l
The Navajo reservation resembles many developing nations in
that it shares many of their characteristics, such as a high
rate of unemployment, lack of labor skills, and exploitation
of natural resources. In addition, capital generated on the
reservation is drained off because the Tribe does not have
an economic base for trade and commerce. Figure l shows how
the Navajo dollar is spent. One of the most critical prob-
lems facing the reservation is the lack of a base for
economic development. The Navajo Tribal Council currently
is concentrating on establishing this system through the
guidelines of The Navajo Ten-Year Plan. One aspect of this
plan is to establish more manufacturing and retail businesses
on the reservation, which will help transform some of the
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agrarian labor force into a skilled, professional labor force.
The goal of the Plan is to create 46,000 jobs at an invest-
ment of $4 billion. Since this program is primarily in the
planning stages, it will be several years before the complete
Plan becomes a reality. Not only is the economic development
plan in its infancy, but also the physical aspects of the
semi-urban sectors on the reservation currently are incapable
of developing the necessary water supply, sewerage and waste
disposal plants, roads, and other required infrastructure
that are common in urban centers. Consequently, transforma-
tion from a rural to a semi-urban/urban concentration will
be a very slow process. Today, approximately 10 percent of
the total reservation population lives in semi-urban areas.
For centuries the Navajo people have lived with the land.
Their primary economic base was established through agricul-
ture, livestock, and handicrafts. The religion, which is a
very important aspect in the culture, is closely identified
with the land and various aspects of nature. This coales-
cence with the land has existed for generations and is
extremely deep-rooted. Because of this feeling, it is no
wonder that the Navajos are reluctant to transform their
culture and give up their identity with the land.
As a result, numerous Navajos adhere to this life-style.
This does not mean that these people will not be affected or
influenced by the exposure to different social, economic, or
environmental changes, but it is important for these influ-
ences to have a lasting impression through choice and not
by force.
Those rural and semi-urban families who are undergoing eco-
nomic and social transition have the highest incident of
poverty, and a large proportion of their labor force is un-
skilled. Because of the difference in ideology, Navajos
neither completely understand the financial activities of
investment nor the use of land as a monetary gain by buying
or selling. For the traditional Navajo, using land for
financial transactions would negate the belief that land is
free as a spirit and should be enjoyed by all.
All of these concerns involved in this transition need to be
considered in any approach to development of the reservation.
To date, there has been no successful overall implementation
of a planning process that will help Navajos make a success-
ful transition. Consequently, this transition should be
viewed as an important change for Navajos. Consideration
should be given to the establishment of development alterna-
tives that will provide a process where the end product will
continue to express the Navajo's world view and life-style,
as well as promote Tribal control through the process of
self-determination.
RESERVATION PROFILE
The following is a brief profile of reservation character-
istics. More detailed information and specific references
for the sources can be found in the Appendix.
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Geographical Area -- The reservation is located in the Four
Corners region of the Southwest United States, encompassing
approximately 25,000 square miles (16 million acres). Its
land mass is larger than the combined areas of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut.
Demography -- With approximately 140,000 people, the Navajo
Tribe is the largest Indian tribe in the United States.
Average family size is 5.6 persons, with a growth rate of
2.5 percent per year. The median age of the Navajos is 16.2
years, with 30 percent of the population 20 years and under.
Income -- The per capita income of Navajos residing on the
reservation as recorded in the 1970 Census was $900, compared
with the national average of $3,900. This means that the
average person living off the reservation had approximately
$3,000 more to spend on consumer goods, housing, food, and
clothing than the average Navajo.
Labor -- It is estimated that the unemployment rate on the
reservation is 31 percent. The potential labor force is
approximately 50,000 men and women (16 years and older). Of
this total, 35,000 are employed and 15,000 are unemployed.
Governmental System -- The main decision- and policymaking
body of Tribal government is the Tribal Council, composed of
87 members who are elected every four years. The executive
body consists of a chairman and vice-chairman of the Tribal
Council who are also elected on a four-year cycle.
Tribal Income -- As mentioned above, many Navajos depend on
the traditional economic system and annual subsidies from
the federal government. In addition, the Tribe receives a
substantial income mostly from mining, petroleum, and fores-
try production. Oil and gas royalties for Fiscal Year 1978
(October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1978) were slightly over
$15 million. Coal royalties for the same year were over
$3 million and for uranium were slightly over $1 million.
One of the Tribe's most successful enterprises is its lumber
industry, Navajo Forest Products Industry, which averaged
over $800,000 profit per year from 1964 to 1976.
THE TEN-YEAR PLAN
"...What is rightfully ours, we must protect;
what is rightfully due us, we must claim.
What we depend on from others, we replace with
the labor of our own hands and the skills of
our own people.
What we do not have, we must bring into being.
We must create for ourselves." 2
Peter MacDonald
Chairman, Navajo Tribe
For years the federal government has neglected the real needs
and demands of the Navajo people. As stated in a 1975 report
of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, "The federal
government, faced with several alternatives, has consistently
opted for the one of least benefit to the Navajo people and
their land and the one most likely to perpetuate a welfare
existence on the reservation."3 Furthermore, a witness to
the Commission, Dr. David Aberle, summed it up as, "the dif-
ference between running a relief economy and running a
development economy. "4 Despite the ineptness of the federal
system to plan adequately for reservation development, the
Navajo Tribe has sustained its culture and life-style. But
with increasing population and pressure to develop additional
alternatives for capital income, the Tribe is confronting
development issues, such as increased unemployment as well as
inadequate transportation and communication networks, educa-
tional institutions, hospitals and clinics, police and fire
protection, and housing, all of which are necessary to sup-
port an adequate social and economic infrastructure for the
reservation.
Consequently, the Navajo Tribal Council developed their Ten-
Year Plan. The principal goal of the Plan is to develop an
economy within the boundaries of the reservation that will
provide the Navajo people a choice of life-style and a plan-
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ning process that assures Navajo control and self-
sufficiency.
SUMMARY OF THE TEN-YEAR PLAN
The Plan initially proposes a combined total of capital in-
vestment from the public sector (federal and state govern-
ments) and existing Tribal funding of approximately $3.8
billion, plus a $2.3 billion capital investment from the
private sector (manufacturing, mining, construction, etc.)
totaling over a ten-year period to an investment of approxi-
mately $4.0 billion. It is proposed that this investment
would generate 46,000 jobs for Navajos -- 26,000 in the
public sector and 20,000 in the private sector.
It should be noted that these funds from the public sector
(federal and state) will be used to improve the social amen-
ities (employment, health, transportation, and so forth)
and business ventures. This allocation of funds was estab-
lished because it was thought that once an adequate social
and physical infrastructure was developed, it would generate
an effective amount of private investment for the economy of
the reservation.
Table 1, which is from the Plan, indicates the capital invest-
ment from both the public and private sectors over the next
ten-year period, including the employment that will be gen-
erated.
The overall objective of the Ten-Year Plan is to promote
Navajo self-sufficiency, both for the individual by providing
a choice of life-style, and for the Tribe as a whole by
becoming less dependent on public funds. The principal stra-
tegy of the Plan is to develop a reservation economic base
that will eliminate the 67 percent capital drain from the
reservation. To accomplish this, the Plan proposes an
increase in social overhead investment, health, education,
housing, labor development, etc. In addition, it proposes
the further development of natural resource production,
industrial and commercial development, improved transporta-
tion, and expansion of agricultural development.
The Plan also contains a summary of deficiencies faced by
the Tribe, such as 61 percent of Navajo homes are without
electricity, 80 percent without water and sewer services,
high rate of infant mortality (42.3 per 1000 live births,
compared to 20.7 nationally), 30 percent unemployment rate,
average education level attained of only five years, com-
pared to 12 years nationally, and so forth. These deficien-
PUBLIC INVESTMENT (TEN YEAR TOTALS)
Table 1
AND RESULTING EMPLOYMENT (ANNUAL AVERAGES)
Social Overhead (Public) Sector* Production (Private) Sector
(Investment in Human Resources Development) (Investment in Directly Productive Activities)
Program Investment Employment Industry Public Share" Employment
10 Years (Per Year) of Investment (Per Year)
Education and Manpower Small Business
Development $1,210,000,000 10,200 Manufacturing, transportation
and construction $ 24,000,000 2,200
Health 422,000,000 3,300 Retail trade and services 30,000,000 4,700
Large Scale Industry
Housing (public sector) 372,000,000 1,500 Footloose Industry 13,000,000 3,000
Resource utilization 1,000,000 1,700
Roads and other NFPI 8,000,000 800
transportation 740,000,000 1,400 Tourism & Recreation
Motels, etc. 26,000,000 1,200
Public Utilities 164,000,000 1,100 Arts & Crafts 10,000,000 (increasedincomes)
Public Services 173,000,000 1,900 Agriculture
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project
Parks and Recreation 137,000,000 5,500 Farms 30,000,000 1,000
Processing 30,000,000 1,000
Land and Water 520,000,000 1,000 Crop production 10,000,000
Transforming traditional agriculture:
Research & Development 40,000,000 100 credit, marketing, etc. 50,000,000 5,000
TOTAL $3,778,000,000 26,000 $232,000,000 20,600
*Includes present, on-going program expenditures as well as needed additional expenditures. About half of the expenditure totals are for present programs and about half are
additional expenditures.
"*Public funds will generate private investment in considerable larger amounts. The amount of private funds will be estimated in Part 11 of the Ten Year Plan's determination
of specific business potentials.
Source: Navajo Ten-Year Plan.
cies, and the capital investment requirements necessary to
correct them, represent only a few of the visible indicators
the Tribe, as a traditional society, are confronting as a
result of its effort to transform into a more technological/
industrial society. Other factors present obstacles to de-
velopment. These include the geographical location of the
reservation, which has created isolation between Navajos and
non-Navajos, and cultural factors which for generations have
promoted a foreign heritage that does not co-exist with the
dominant white society. Moreover, as the Ten-Year Plan
indicates, there is little capital for funding an individual
Navajo entrepreneur. In addition to these institutional
issues, there is a more subtle obstacle in the development
process that may not be so evident to the Tribal Council
policymakers. That very important factor, which the Tribal
Council should view as synonymous with self-determination,
is control. At this time, the Tribe does not have adequate
influence over controlling factors, such as investment capi-
tal, technology, and other economic forces exerted from
outside the reservation. This is not an unusual situation
for a developing region. But with the goal of the Ten-Year
Plan stressing self-sufficiency, Tribal policy and decision-
makers should be aware that, as their needs increase, their
dependence on outside forces will not permit the control they
need to attain the goal of self-sufficiency through the pro-
cess of self-determination.
The development process of the Ten-Year Plan emphasizes a
development priority with the assumption that the Tribe's
most evident sources are those in the area of natural re-
sources and their labor force. This is not to be disputed,
but there appears a dichotomy in the strategy. First, the
Tribe's natural resources, especially coal, are very attrac-
tive to off-reservation investors, and for the most part
this product will enhance the Tribe's goal of increasing
investments from the private sector. Second, the Tribe
would like to create employment opportunities for its unem-
ployed. Herein lies the conflict that is analogous to
developing nations. As stated by E.F. Schumacher in Small
Is Beautiful, "Large projects are invariably more economic
than small ones, and it proves that capital-intensive pro-
jects are invariably to be preferred as against labour-
intensive ones,"5 but "this means that those who have nothing
to sell but their labour remain in the weakest possible bar-
gaining position. ,6 Given the fact that the Tribe would
like to achieve the goals of increasing capital investment
and decreasing the unemployment rate through a controlled
process of self-determination, their policy decisions and
implementation of a planning process should consider a more
comprehensive approach. Inducing increased capital invest-
ment into the reservation does not imply that the social
needs and demands of the Navajos will evolve in a natural
order. This is especially true when considering the fact
that the Navajo Tribe is an indigenous society striving to
maintain its identity and increase control over its destiny.
The Navajo Tribe cannot evolve as a Tribe without controlling
the economic development process and simultaneously satisfy-
ing the needs and demands that will be placed on the Navajo
society. The Ten-Year Plan states the deficiencies and pro-
poses solutions for correcting these deficiencies, but this
does not absolutely guarantee control over the process
because it will be the individual Navajo or Navajos that
will have to implement and control the process of self-
determination. How does this happen?
In considering the Tribal Council's ability to control and
implement reservation development, existing and past ventures
of economic development should be reviewed. The following
illustrations are presented as examples to demonstrate the
Tribal Council's ability for developing local Navajo capa-
bilities in operating reservation economic ventures, if the
controlling features such as (1) management, (2) employment
(hiring process, training, etc.), and (3) marketing, are not
to be dominated by off-reservation corporations. The
examples will focus on two business ventures located on the
reservation. One involves a large off-reservation corpora-
tion, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation, that
dominated the controlling features above. The second exa-
mines the Tribal-owned lumber enterprise, Navajo Forest
Products Industries. This is a business venture in which
the Tribe has invested both capital and human resources,
but not without the problems of management, employment, etc.,
related to controlling the industry or the sociocultural
changes. These examples are presented to show that, given
time and the right decision of Navajo Tribal economic ven-
tures, the Tribe can develop a process for controlling its
business ventures.
In 1965, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation con-
tracted the operation and production of a semiconductor
assembly plant located on the reservation in Shiprock, New
Mexico. The physical structure of the plant was built by
the Navajo Tribe ($1.5 mil\ion), financed through the
Economic Development Administration and then leased to
Fairchild. At one period of the industry's history, it
employed 1,200 Navajos with 30 non-Navajo managers and
supervisors. In 1974, the industry employed about 900
Navajos with an annual payroll of $5.6 million. During
this period of operation, Fairchild exercised almost com-
plete control of the industry. These controlling factors
were:
1. Management. The non-Navajo employees represented
the top management of the Shiprock Plant. They,
in turn, were controlled by the national parent
corporation located in Mountain View, California.
There were some Navajo supervisors, but most of
the highly technical jobs were filled with non-
Navajo employees.
2. Employment. The industry had its own personnel
office and hired Navajos from throughout the reser-
vation. The on-the-job training program was sub-
sidized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA
paid one-half of the employee's salary for the
duration of the individual's training period. The
criticism expressed by a BIA official was that the
industry tended to terminate some employees shortly
after they were trained or transfer them to another
section that would require further training and,
consequently, more BIA subsidization.
3. Marketing. The market for the industry's product
was entirely off the reservation and primarily con-
sisted of federal defense contracts. This influ-
enced the viability of the industry. It had to
respond to the market fluctuation, especially toward
the end of the Viet Nam War when many government
contracts involving this product began to terminate.
In 1975, ten years after the industry had been established on
the reservation, Fairchild terminated the contract with the
Navajo Tribe. It finally closed the plant in June 1976.
Several events culminated at that time which led to Fair-
child's decision to close the plant. First, the federal
demand for semiconductors was decreasing because of the de-
cline of the Viet Nam War. By 1975, the plant's employment
was down from 1,200 to 650 Navajo employees, and it appeared
that more employees would be released. At the local level
in Shiprock, the American Indian Movement (AIM), began to
protest the release of Navajo employees and accused the cor-
poration of seeking a cheaper labor market in a foreign
country. Consequently, AIM took over the facilities and
demanded that Fairchild rehire the released Navajo employees.
After the takeover, Fairchild demanded assurance from the
Tribal Chairman that AIM would not create any further con-
flicts. When the Chairman could not comply, Fairchild
decided to terminate their contract with the Navajo Tribe,
stating that without the assurance from the Tribe concerning
AIM's activities, the industry would have to close the plant.
Unofficially, tribal officials suspected that the AIM take-
over was the red herring and due to the cut back in the
market demand of semiconductors and the future potential of
securing a cheaper labor market, was the actual reason for
Fairchild's decision. As a result, the 650 Navajo employees
were laid off, and a plant of 72,000 square feet sits unoccu-
pied.
Because of the nature of the industry, the employees' train-
ing and knowledge was limited to the one product of semi-
conductors. Because this was the only plant of its kind on
the reservation, the Navajos trained to produce this product
would have to seek employment opportunities off the reserva-
tion.
The second illustration involves a Tribal-owned lumber enter-
prise. Although lumber has been produced on the reservation
since the 1880's, it was not until 1958 that the Tribe offi-
cially organized the Navajo Forest Products Industries. With
an initial investment of $12.5 million ($7.5 million for the
lumber mill and $5 million for housing), the Tribe not only
increased the production of their lumber resources, but also
created a small town. The town is situated on the eastern
side of the reservation where the population density of
Navajos is the highest. Although the present population is
about 1,800 people, the town of Navajo has a service area of
nearly 30,000 individuals in a 25-mile radius.
The Tribal Council is anxious to further the development of
the town, but must overcome basic social and economic prob-
lems. First, the town was created around the lumber mill,
which exists primarily for the employment of Navajo men and
women. The mill employs about 600 Navajos and 20 non-
Navajos. These 20 employees, however, are the controlling
force of the mill. The inability of the Navajos to partici-
pate even marginally in the management process of decision-
making concerning the mill's operation is of serious concern
to the Navajo employees. The problems of the separation of
workers from management by race has serious implications for
the distribution of individual incomes and collective goods.
The economic and social disparity reflects either directly
or indirectly on the human settlement pattern and ultimately
will have a profound influence on the further development of
the town.
The most difficult social differences are those that stem
from the depths of disparate cultures. These deep-seated
differences are hardest to change or control. The differ-
ences in the Navajo and Anglo cultures are expressed through
day-to-day living situations and in attitudes toward work
and social activity. Specifically, the feeling of cultural
separateness and the attitudinal impediments to any meaning-
ful participation in the Anglo-dominated sectors of produc-
tion have combined to eliminate the incentive for the
Navajos to attempt to control their own destiny. The Navajo
employee of the lumber mill has been conditioned by circum-
stance and culture to withdraw from the operations of the
mill, thereby increasing existing differences between the
Anglo manager and the Navajo workers.
The following is a suggested process by which the Navajos
can help themselves gain skills, confidence, and management
responsibility. The fact is that both the town of Navajo
and the mill were created by the Navajo Tribal Council,
which ultimately has responsibility and control over the
welfare of the people in the town. To a large extent, it
may be in the Council's power -- if they are willing -- to
help the Navajos attain their potential as human beings,
to increase their income, and to decrease the difference of
class and status between the Navajos and their Anglo manager.
This, in sum, is a design for attitudinal and institutional
change in the direction of an eventual redistribution of
resources, power, and prestige in the Navajo settlement.
The above review of socio-economic differences and the prob-
lems they have created leads to a discussion of the possible
approach to implementation of the self-determination goal.
At least four processes are in order:
A. Initiation of contact with the dominant source of power,
namely, the Navajo Tribal Council;
B. Achievement of control over the Management Board of the
mill;
C. Modification of the hiring process, specifically in terms
of the qualifications pertaining to the superintendents;
D. Implementation of increased working/educational oppor-
tunities for the Navajos.
In creating the Management Board of the mill, which consists
of four Navajos and four non-Navajos, the Tribal Council
wanted to ensure its own responsibility for policies. How-
ever, the Tribal Council has over time relied heavily on
the non-Navajo board members for direction in the operation
of the mill. It has become evident that by doing so, the
Council has de facto given up its power to govern. For this
reason, the Council must be reminded of the original inten-
tions underlying the mill's creation. It must be made aware
of the extent to which these intentions have been displaced
by relegating governing power to non-Navajo members of the
Management Board. An important step in implementing insti-
tutional change in Navajo is contact -- in person or in
writing -- with the Tribal Council to remind its members
that they are elected officials of the Navajo Tribe with
responsibilities to the people, their constituents.
The second aspect of the implementation strategy is for the
Tribe to gain control over the Management Board gradually
by increasing the number of Navajo board members to five and
limiting the non-Navajo representation to four. It seems
that the best approach is a direct one, namely, persuading
the Tribal Council to use their influence in the appointment
of Navajos to the Board.
The third component of the strategy relates to the appoint-
ment of Navajos as supervisors in the mill. Although initi-
ally non-Navajos were recruited to take supervisory positions
so as to train Navajo successors, this process has achieved
slow results. Most of the Anglo supervisors hired in the
mill are within 10 to 12 years of retirement. Because they
have comfortable homes and relatively superior incomes, it
is unlikely that they would be willing to displace themselves
by training younger individuals to qualify for their jobs.
Satisfactory and equally profitable work would be difficult
for them to find at their age. This particular problem could
be resolved by changing hiring practices at the mill. First,
by limiting the age of a prospective supervisor to one that
is young, the person would not have the fear of finding em-
ployment after the training process of a Navajo is success-
fully completed. Or second, this hiring process could be
eliminated completely. In its place, a private or govern-
mental grant could support a special program of training for
Navajos with the instructors being hired for a specific time
period and a specific training task. This would eliminate
the incentive to slow down or effectively limit the training
of Navajo supervisors that is inherent under the present
system.
But perhaps the final and most important aspect of the imple-
mentation strategy is the creation of a feeling of self-
assurance and pride on the part of the Navajo workers. Self-
confidence and a sense of personal responsibility are closely
interrelated. The Navajos must be given opportunities to
develop confidence in their ability to carry out responsi-
bility. Some of this could be obtained through additional
on-the-job training, perhaps in combination with study grants,
which would be of enormous utility in increasing the capa-
bility of Navajo individuals in the professions of forestry,
management, or business.
In viewing this illustration as an opportunity to confront a
real problem existing in the town of Navajo, it quickly
becomes apparent that in the "solution" of the disparities
in income and social class among Navajos and non-Navajos
working in the mill, other difficulties remain unresolved.
In other words, in complying with two of the design criteria
specified earlier, namely, the maximization of incomes and the
minimization of social class differences, one must still con-
front the entrenched interests, habits, and attitudes of the
Navajo government, i.e., the Navajo Tribal Council. The lack
of government adaptability to change is perhaps the source of
a great deal of conflict in the course of implementing the
objectives as has been spelled out above. But recognizing
this element does not require -- given the terms of reference
of the exercise -- the design of another settlement pattern
or city. This is because an interesting paradox emerges
in the process. While on the one hand, the Tribal Council
resists change, at the same time its constituents are demand-
ing that policies do change and that greater attention is paid
to their advancement. Thus, although conflict with the Tribal
Council may be expected in the initial stages of the process,
the process itself may help the Council become more sensitive,
more sympathetic, and more attuned to its constituents. And
finally, another paradox becomes evident. In the process of
equalizing social status and reducing the disparity in in-
comes by promoting Navajo workers to managerial and super-
visory jobs in the mill (jobs previously held by non-
Navajos), disparities among Navajos will become more evident.
The inherent conflict between manager and worker will not
be erased by replacing an Anglo manager with a Navajo. Given
that both are of the same cultural group, the discord will
not be as severe. The differences in social class and income
will continue, and it is difficult to predict what other
unforeseen consequences will become apparent as the initial
design criteria laid out here are implemented. At least one
thing is clear. The redistribution of resources, control,
and prestige from non-Navajo to Navajo will enable the
Navajos to recognize and deal with emerging difficulties and
problems by themselves and for themselves instead of continu-
ing their reliance on external assistance.
These illustrations do not imply that the Tribal Council's
goals for self-sufficiency are inadequate, but with any new
policy, there has to be a planning process and implementa-
tion. As Schumacher stated, "It is not enough merely to have
a new policy; new methods of organization are required because
the policy is in the implementation."
In comparing the illustrations and assessing the controlling
factors, as mentioned on page 21, the following conclusions
are made:
1. Management. The Fairchild venture was completely
controlled and influenced by off-reservation
powers with no input or monitoring by the Tribal
Council or Navajo employees. The Forest Products
Industry has Navajo members on its Board and is
monitored by the Tribal Council, and it is through
these two sources that Navajo employees of the
lumber mill can have the option of presenting their
concerns.
2. Employment. The on-the-job training program in the
Fairchild plant was again controlled by the non-
Navajo management with minimum monitoring by BIA
and no monitoring from the Tribal Council. Conse-
quently, the program was misused by moving trainees
from section to section to be retrained and eventu-
ally working themselves out of a job once the train-
ing was over. On the other hand, the training
program in the Forest Products Industries is moni-
tored by both the Navajo Board members and Tribal
Council. Navajo employees are learning a skill and
retaining employment after their training program.
3. Marketing. The product of the Fairchild Industry
was completely controlled by the off-reservation
market. The product could not be used locally and,
depending on the demand, the industry either pros-
pered or declined. In this situation, the latter
was the case and the industry closed down. Although
the Forest Products Industry's market for lumber
extends off the reservation, the market is not
controlled by one source and supplies a variety of
businesses. Moreover, the product can be used
locally on the reservation and being a renewable
resource, its marketability will contribute to an
economic base for the reservation for an indefinite
future.
The external influences on reservation development will have
an impact on the Navajo's goal of obtaining self-determination
through control. Yet other examples, such as the Forest
Products Industries, will become the more successful Navajo
economic ventures. These successes will demonstrate the
Navajo's ability to develop a process for controlling their
own affairs and destiny.
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CHAPTER II
COAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE NAVAJO RESERVATION
The Navajo Tribe is venturing into a socio-economic transi-
tional phase that will develop implications which will deter-
mine the future status of the reservation. This transition
is developing more rapidly because of the recent energy
crisis and consequently, the influence of federal and private
industrial propoals for extracting natural resources from the
reservation to be converted into energy-producing resources.
This type of exploitation is certainly not new for the
Navajo Tribe or any other American Indians. The colonial
attitude imposed upon Indian people by the federal government
and private industry has historically created situations of
forced assimilation and, in some cases, genocide. The Navajo
Tribe has suffered economically, socially, and politically,
and this abuse has occurred mostly from the lack of exposure
(direct involvement or confrontation) of Tribal policymakers
in the business/political world of white American society.
With the abundant supply of natural resources on the reserva-
tion (coal and uranium), the Navajo Tribe is faced with its
energy crisis: exploitation by off-reservation industrial
developers. The challenge confronting the Tribe will be
institutionalizing new policies that will benefit, not sup-
press, the economic development process of the reservation.
This process of self-determination can be accomplished by
developing and implementing Tribal policies that will estab-
lish firm control over the economic development transition
of the reservation by and for the Navajo people.
Because of the Navajo Tribe's traditional pastoral society,
with its distinct social, economic, and political ideologies,
the direction and implementation of new development policies
becomes increasingly complex. There exists both internal and
external problems in developing these new policies for the
reservation. The major internal conflict is an attempt to
reduce the unemployment (30 percent) rate by developing the
natural resources while maintaining at least the most impor-
tant traditional ideologies of the Navajo culture. Compound-
ing the problems of this development strategy is the Tribe's
exposure to limited industrialization models, imposed by
external influences within the bureaucracy of the federal
government and private industrial concerns.
"Power is not merely politics, and I think that
underlying the problem of power is the problem
of economic interests, that oil companies do not
like to share profits with the Navajo Tribe, that
whenever there is a charge between a settlement
that could be made on the reservation and could
be made in Farmington, Gallup, Flagstaff, or
Winslow, the choice will be made in favor of the
border communities, and that, in other words,
whenever it is a question of Navajo interests or
other interests, the choice goes in favor of
other interests."1
For the most part, policies introduced from off-reservation
sources have been very limited in providing viable socio-
economic alternatives for the future development of the
reservation. The lack of alternatives is especially evident
in the area of economic development. The emphasis of this
approach to developing the reservation has been designed
totally on the economic scale (needs and demands of external
reservation markets), with the attitude that once the economic
of the Tribe is decided, then the social and political aspects
will develop in a natural order. It is this influence that
has contributed to the complexities of reservation develop-
ment. Without improved methods of control and choice of
development procedures, the Navajo people will continually
be exploited and their future controlled by external needs
and demands.
As stated in Chapter I, to stimulate the process of self-
determination, the Navajo Tribe is venturing into various
industrial development programs. To date, the most lucrative
ventures in terms of economic returns is the selling and
leasing of natural resources such as lumber, oil, uranium,
and coal. Considering these resources, coal will have the
most immediate impact on future development policies for the
reservation. Because of the international energy crisis,
coal has become a more competitive energy source, and the
reservation has projected coal resources of approximately
4 billion tons. Encouraged by the federal government and
private coal corporations, the Tribal Government has signed
coal leases that are not in the best interest for the devel-
opment of the reservation. In addition to the poorly nego-
tiated contracts, the short-term and long-term ramifications
of this process of industrialization are not fully realized
or comprehended by Tribal policy developers. This situation
is a result of the Tribe's lack of exposure to this form of
regional development and poor coordination of control over a
comprehensive development plan.
The objective of this chapter is to present a general per-
spective of the planning situation of the Four Corners Region
of the reservation. The development and growth of this area
is becoming more complex because of proposed additions to
existing strip mining ventures and proposals for the con-
struction of coal gasification plants to be located on the
reservation. The impact of this industrialization will
increase the demands on the existing social, economic, poli-
tical, and environmental qualities of the Navajo reservation
and surrounding states. The following will concentrate
specifically on these two industries and explore alternative
methods that will establish control of the development pro-
cess by the Navajo Tribe.
ILLUSTRATION 1 -- STRIP MINING
The development of coal on the Navajo reservation is part of
a comprehensive plan by utility and coal companies and federal
agencies to develop massive electrical power for the growing
demands of urban areas throughout the West Coast and South-
west region of the United States.2 This development is exem-
plified by two existing coal-fired power plants in New Mexico
in the Four Corners Region, and proposals for the construction
of three additional plants by 1985 in Arizona and Utah. With
a substantial portion of coal reserves located on the reser-
vation (estimated 4 billion tons of coal under 500 square
miles in the Four Corners Region) and within relatively con-
venient distances to the power plants, the Tribe immediately
becomes a prime producer of marketable coal. But to date,
the Navajo Tribe has only remained the owner of these re-
serves and the real producers have been large mining corpor-
ations. Strip mining started in this area in 1953 when Utah
International, Inc. (UII) secured an exploration permit from
the Navajo Tribe. The lease agreement for the actual strip
mining of 24,864 acres of land was signed in 1957, with a
second lease for 6,547 acres. The second lease agreement
signed was between the Navajo Tribe and El Paso Natural Gas-
Consolidation Coal Company (El Paso-Consol) in 1968. The
value of the coal in royalties to the Navajo Tribe is 150/ton
and 20/ton, respectively, in the two UII leases, and 55C/ton
or 12-1/2 percent (depending on which figure is the higher)
of the price of coal upon delivery (fob).
Given the existing economic situation on the reservation as
identified in Chapter I, the Tribe has decided to increase
the development of their coal resources as one alternative
to achieve their goals in the Ten-Year Plan. The issue now
becomes one of developing viable development alternatives
that will provide absolute self-control by the Tribe. The
development of these options for control are not only a
process for defending the Tribe from outside intervention,
but involves the creation of alternatives that will include
the basis for future Navajo self-determination.
The following illustration will present the current develop-
ment situation in the Four Corners Region, with an emphasis
on strip mining. Also, the impacts of this industry will be
discussed and a presentation will be given of proposed alter-
natives that could provide rectification of past Tribal
coal/land leases with a perspective of future issues the
Tribe will have to confront and consider when future develop-
ment proposals are established.
STRIP MINING -- PRESENT STATUS
Theoretically, before any form of lease sale, a coal evalua-
tion is required of the respective lessor Indian Tribe,
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to determine the
potential reserves, quality, mining accessibility, and mar-
ketability. These technical examinations are supposed to
establish guidelines for the amount of royalty rates that the
Tribe should expect to receive for leasing its land and sale
of coal. Usually, after this function is determined, the
actual lease can be accomplished through competitive bidding
among interested companies or by direct negotiations between
the Tribe and coal company. Regardless of the choice of
lease, the Department of Interior/Bureau of Indian Affairs
have the final approval of leases accepted by the Tribal
Council.
LAND AND COAL LEASING
There are guidelines that determine the minimum standards
which are included in mining leases between Indian tribes
and private companies. Before final signature, the following
criteria are considered and determined by the respective
federal bureaus and Indian Tribe:
(1) Whether a permit should be issued or a
lease entered into,
(2) The acreage to be covered,
(3) The royalty rate,
(4) The annual rental rate,
(5) The minimum acceptable bonus bid for
competitive lease. 4
The first consideration is determined by the respective Tribe,
BIA, USGS, and BLM, depending on estimated coal reserves
(quantity and quality). As stated in the Code of Federal
Regulations (25 CFR, Part 171 -- Leasing of Tribal Lands for
Mining), the minimum on floor figures5 for acreage per lease
is 2,560, royalty rate of 100/ton, and an annual rental share
of $1/acre. The bonus bid acceptable is usually determined
through the best bid/acre lease proposal by an interested
company. Bonuses are usually paid to the respective Tribe
before mining actually starts. Also, the term of leases as
stated in 25 CFR, 171, is for a period "not to exceed ten
years from the date of approval by the Secretary of the
Interior. 6
As mentioned, the Navajo Tribe has signed leases in the Four
Corners Region with Utah International (UII) and El Paso
Natural Gas-Consolidation Coal Company (El Paso-Consol).
Table 2 indicates the terms of the leases.
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Table 2. Terms of Coal Mining Leases by the Navajo Tribe
Lessee Date Royalty/Ton Acreage Annual Rental/Acre Bonus Bid
Utah Inter- 1957 150 first 24,869 $1/acre 0
national lease
20C second 6,547
lease
El Paso - 1968 200/ton 40,287 $1.25/acre 0
Consol
rene- 550/ton or 40,287 $1.25/acre $5.6
goti- 12.5% of million
ated the f.o.b.
1976 mine price
NOTE: Prior to bonus bids, the Navajo Tribe was receiving advanced royalty
payrents that would eventually be deducted from their future royalty
payments. The amount of the bonus bid is not deducted from future
royalty payments.
Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs.
LEASING -- DISADVANTAGES AND ADVANTAGES
Leasing guidelines as established and monitored by the federal
government has had a questionable history of truly represent-
ing the interest of Indian Tribes. As examples, a 1972 report
by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) entitled "Adminis-
tration of Regulations for Surface Exploration, Mining and
Reclamation of Public and Indian Coal Lands," stated, "No
guidelines or instructions to assist them [BIA field person-
nel] in conducting technical examinations or in developing
the permit or lease requirements...;" furthermore, "The BIA
did not conduct technical examinations for six permits and
six leases we reviewed, which were subject to the regula-
tions." Perhaps a more noted allegation of federal negli-
gence came from the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in Montana.8
Their legal counsel comprised a list of 36 violations toward
coal contracts that had been approved by the federal govern-
ment. Among these violations were:
a) Failure to perform technical pre-leasing
examinations of surface exploration and
mining operations;
b) Failure to incorporate legally required
environmental protection clauses in the
contract;
c) Failure to prepare environmental impact
statements;
d) Failure to make required on-site inspections;
e) Failure to demand adequate performance and
exploration bonds.
It was on the basis of these violations that the Tribe peti-
tioned the Department of the Interior to withdraw the Depart-
ment's approval of the leases in the best interest of the
Tribe. Subsequently, Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton did rule
in favor of the Northern Cheyennes and the issues involving
the coal leases on the reservation were held in abeyance
until the Tribe could come to an agreement with the coal
companies involved. To date, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
has decided not to develop any of its coal resources.
The Department of Interior is reponsible for adminstering
coal reserves throughout the United States. These controls
are administered through the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and
the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of 1938, which authorizes the
leasing of both public and Indian mineral rights. Herein
exists a conflict, because leasing regulations of public and
Indian coal reserves are often treated by the federal govern-
ment as one and the same. In other words, what is good for
the public is good for the Indians. When, in fact, because
of the peace treaties between the U.S. Government and Indian
Tribes, the status of Indians and their land holding have a
different status. Although the reservation land is held in
trust by the government, the minerals and land are owned by
the respective Tribe and due to their sovereign rights, they
should have control over their holdings.
An excellent example of misuse of Indian lands by the federal
government involves the granting of prospective permits.
Regardless of land holding (public or Indian), the first
priority in leasing is to determine the land value and mineral
content. Public land prospecting permits are awarded to in-
terested companies through a preference-right leasing system
established in the Leasing Act of 1920. This system gives
the lessee company the exclusive right to lease all of por-
tions of land that the prospecting company has found to
contain workable quantities of coal. Obviously, this elimin-
ates competition and encourages companies to hold land for
speculative purposes. By granting this form of permits for
Indian land, the Tribe is immediately placed at a disadvan-
tage because their option of opening the sale of coal reserves
to competitive bidding is eliminate.
Consequently, the assistance the Tribe receives from the
federal government in preparation for negotiating coal leases
becomes a conflict of interest. on the one hand, the govern-
ment has the obligation of trust responsibility and in this
specific case the responsibility is to help the Tribe obtain
coal contracts that will be in the best interest of the Tribe.
Yet they conduct proceedings related to Indian land holdings
as though it were public land. Through the preference-right
leasing system and elimination of competition, the question
arises as to whom the government is representing in the best
interest, the coal companies or the Indian Tribe? As an
example, both the Utah International and El Paso coal leases
were negotiated after the companies obtained mineral prospect-
ing permits (exclusive with option) and found substantial coal
deposits. El Paso obtained its original permit in 1959 for
85,760 acres of land by submitting the required $10.00 filing
fee and 250/acre rental for each year. But it was not until
proven coal deposits were found that a final lease was nego-
tiated with the Tribe in 1968 for 40,281 acres of land. Under
this leasing system coal companies can retain large tracts of
land for a period of two years. After two years, the permit
does not terminate, because the company retains an option
of the permit by proving they have performed reasonable dili-
gence during the first two years of prospecting. This is
usually done by claiming the company has invested more than
$1/acre. Thus, the lessee company can perpetuate the permit
until a favorable market value for coal is established.
The influence that the Department of Interior has exercised
over the leasing of Indian land for mining purposes is
evident when comparing public and reservation leasing. Cur-
rently there are 17 Indian leases in seven Western states
(four on the Navajo reservation) compared with 465 public
leases, as shown in Table 3 . The startling fact is the
average Indian lease is for 15,221 acres/lease and the average
public lease is 1,471 acres/lease. The large number of acres/
lease is granted despite 25 CFR, 171, which states that
ordinary Indian coal leases shall be limited to 2,560 acres/
lease, unless the lessee can justify larger acreage/lease
is in the interest of the Tribe.9 Although there are more
public leases than Indian, the percentage of coal production
is higher on Indian reservations. Federal leases producing
coal is 11.6 percent compared to 29.9 percent production on
Indian coal leases.
After coal leases are signed, the Tribe receives two forms of
revenue. One is a minimum base rental rate of $1/acre/year
and second, a minimum royalty rate of 100/ton of coal. Both
of these regulations were originally established by the
Department of Interior without a sliding royalty system.
Consequently, any coal price increase would not provide the
Tribe a readjusted royalty rate on their coal lease. Indian
coal leases can be adjusted every ten years (twenty years for
Table 3. Coal Acreage Under Lease As Of March 1976
FEDERAL INDIAN TOTAL
leases acreage leases acreage leases acreage
ARIZ. 0 0 2 64,858 2 64,858
COLO. 113 112,247 1 19,452 114 141,699
MONT. 17 36,232 10 91,396 27 127,628
N. MEX. 28 40,958 3 82,860 31 123,818
N. DAK. 19 16,276 0 0 19 16,276
UTAH 197 268,555 1 200 198 268,755
WYOM. 91 199,944 0 0 91 199,944
465 684,212 17 258,766 482 942,978
NOTES: Average Federal Lease per acre = 1,471 acres/lease.
Average Indian Lease per acre = 15,221 acres/lease.
Federal Leases producing coal = 11.6%.
Indian Leases producing coal = 29.9%.
Sources: Bureau of Land Management
U.S. Geological Survey
public leases), but this is not closely monitored and usually
adjustments are made at the end of the twenty year period.
This identification between public and Indian lands by the
Department of Interior has greater repercussions for the
Navajo reservation. Because of the relative size (geograph-
ical and population) and wealth, the United States Government
is better prepared bo absorb any losses that might occur
through minimum coal-leasing regulations. Of course, the
federal government is not in the coal business and therefore
can accept lower leasing terms when negotiating with coal
corporations. If the Tribe is encouraged to accept leasing
contracts based upon federal guidelines, then the reservation
will suffer more. This becomes evident when the percentage
of leased land on the reservation to leased public land in
the United States. Given the geographical and economic
situation, the Navajo Tribe cannot absorb economic losses or
great damage to their environment without creating severe
ramifications on the reservation.
The Navajo Tribe's dependence on federal agencies for estab-
lishing the criteria that determine the outcome of land/coal
leasing has placed the Tribe in a vulnerable position with
coal corporations. Because of the lenient prospecting and
leasing laws of public land and natural resources, private
industry has been able to select land holdings at their own
will for minimal cost to the industry. Unfortunately, the
leasing of Tribal land is under the guidelines that identify
their land with public land and this expense to the reserva-
tion has only profited the coal industry. There are changes
in the present procedure of land leasing that the Navajo
Tribe can make to benefit the reservation immediately and in
the future. Of course, this will require the Tribe to re-
evaluate their present objectives and priorities for economic
growth, the time element for developing their coal reserves,
and to what extent they actually want to become involved in
the coal industry. In the long-term, the objectives should
include the establishment of new legislation that would make
a clear distinction between Indian and public land.
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the Secretary of the Interior does have final
approval or disapproval of Indian leases, it must be remem-
bered that in many cases Tribes do and often take the initi-
ative of first negotiating with energy companies for the
rights to leasing reservation land and minerals. Conse-
quently, with the goal of self-determination, the Navajo
Tribe should investigate their own procedures and policy with
regard to negotiating and leasing their land and natural re-
sources.
In light of the Tribe's objective to accomplish self-
determination and the ever-growing demand for natural energy
production, the pressure to produce Navajo coal resources
will increase. Therefore, in evaluating their present land
and coal leasing status, several alternatives could be con-
sidered in the establishment of a coal development strategy.
Three considerations should be assessed:
1) Formation of a Tribal minerals contract office,
2) Cancellation or renegotiation of existing leases,
3) Re-evaluation of alternative coal development
ventures:
a) Joint ventures
b) Tribal enterprise
Tribal Minerals Office: In all past natural resource leases,
the Tribal Council has been responsible for approving the
contracts. But the principal negotiator has been the Coun-
cil's Office of General Counsel. This office is under con-
tract and directly responsible to the Tribal Executive Body
and the Tribal Council. It is with this office that direct
or referred contact is made by corporations interested in ex-
ploring for possible mineral reserves or bargaining for proven
reserves. Of the ten divisions of the Tribal Government
organization, the Minerals Department is the only other Tribal
office that has direct involvement in negotiation proceedings.
As mentioned before, the Department of the Interior through
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, and
U.S. Geological Survey, is responsible for assisting the
Tribe by supplying additional data pertaining to the land and
mineral resources that are considered in the negotiations.
It is very important to stress the function of negotiations,
because the initial commitment of the Tribe to lease their
coal will have long-term impacts throughout all aspects of
the reservation. As stated by Charles Lipton, International
Minerals Negotiator:
"It has become fasionable lately to apply games
theory to negotiations. In an era of computer
technology, there is a tendency to try to reduce
almost every human process to numbers which can
be programmed for the computer. There are
still, however, some areas of the human experi-
ence which defy the computer, including among
others the art of negotiations." 1 0
Because negotiation will affect more than on division within
the Tribal government structure and since the consequences
will have a direct impact throughout the entire reservation,
it is recommended that an office, for negotiating and moni-
toring Tribal mineral and oil leases, be established. It is
essential that one office have this responsibility because
the Tribe has to be reassured of knowing (1) who is directly
responsible for negotiating mineral contracts and that they
have the best interest for the Tribe; (2) how familiar they
are with Tribal overall objectives; (3) that they have or
can acquire expertise in understanding and dealing with the
outside corporate structures; (4) have a full understanding
of the trade-offs confronting the Tribe; (5) knowledge of
direct short- and long-term alternatives that would be advan-
tageous for the reservation; and (6) ability to coordinate
Tribal and federal participation in the negotiating process.
With coal becoming a more competitive energy resource, the
competition for mining the resource and methods for gaining
the highest returns for an industry's investment will become
an increasingly critical factor of coal negotiations. There-
fore, if the Tribe has at its disposal the best qualified
experts in negotiating coal leases, they could assure more
control and better coordinate any comprehensive development
process. It should be noted that in some cases the Tribe
and the proposed office may have to go beyond the existing
Tribal government structure and contract with professional
negotiators who not only have the interest of the Tribe, but
the knowledge of the prevailing coal market, its potential,
and, of course, of the corporations with which they are
negotiating.
Cancellation or Renegotiation: There are specified responsi-
bilities the federal government is obligated to maintain in
their transaction with Indian tribes. These obligations vary
according to the circumstance, but in general are referred to
as federal trust responsibility towards Indian tribes. Pre-
sumably, this trust status is defined as actions taken by
the federal government to represent, advise, assist, etc.
Indians in ways that are in the best interest of the respec-
tive tribe. If this trust is taken too literally by Indian
tribes, without the realization of who is defining best
interest, then the tribe is placing itself at the mercy of
federal agencies that will continue to dominate every move
toward future development that the tribe wishes to make.
In this case, the trust responsibility is in terms of
federal advice to the Navajo Tribe over their method of nego-
tiating their natural resources for the establishment of a
stronger economic base for the reservation. Certainly, the
minimum standards set forth by the federal government for
securing prospecting permits and coal leases is a basis for
negotiating contracts, but the Tribal Council should realize
that these are economic standards originally applicable to
the requirements of leasing public lands, and when applied
to reservation land, they do not necessarily represent the
present needs and demands of the Tribe. The most important
consideration is the enforcement of laws and requirements for
mining, regardless of who establishes the guidelines.
Only the Secretary of the Interior has the authority of can-
celling mineral leases for Indian tribes, as stated in 25 CFR,
171.27: "When, in the opinion of the Secretary of the In-
terior, the lessee has violated any of the terms and condi-
tions of a lease or of the applicable regulations,"" and
"to declare such lease null and void, and the Lessor shall
then be entitled and authorized to take immediate possession
of the land."12 It is interesting to note that, included in
the original coal lease in 1957 between the Navajo Tribe and
Utah International, Section G, the stipulation under Surrender
and Termination was "The lessee shall have the right at any
time during the term thereof to surrender and terminate this
lease or any part thereof." Unfortunately, Indian tribes
cannot nationalize resource operations on their reservations.
Also, the federal government is very sensitive when it comes
to "charges of nonfeasance in exercise of their trust respon-
sibilities. " 13 Given the strong oppositions by the federal
establishment in cancelling leases and, as David Aberle
stated:
"Bureau officials are constrained in many ways:
they wish to be primarily concerned for Navajos,
but they must be concerned lest they violate their
role as trustees for Indian property, and lest
they upset local interests, who in turn will put
pressure on Congress, which will put pressure on
them. Furthermore, neither Congress nor federal
officials have to live with mistakes in dealing 14
with Navajo resources as closely as Navajos do."
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This does not imply that the Tribe should not petition the
government for cancellation, or renegotiate leases because
the Tribe does have examples of federal non-feasance. For
example, the leases with Utah International and El Paso-Consol
are for 31,416 acres and 40,287 acres, respectively, compared
to the average federal lease per acre which equals 1,465 acres/
lease. Also the regulations establish an acreage limitation
of 2,560 acres per lease or "of such larger acreage is in
the interest of the lessor." l5 But the standard argument
that is used to justify additional acreage is made by the
coal industry. It usually states that for a coal project to
be profitable, it must in this case be more than the pre-
scribed 2,560 acres. The basis of this argument is that
large land holdings makes the coal lease more profitable for
the coal industry (their capital returns on investment) and
therefore, makes it more profitable for the Navajo Tribe.
The question is on what grounds did the BIA approve the
larger lease holdings. If the justification was based on
behalf of the coal industries argument, then perhaps the
Tribe should use the regulation of the minimum 2,560 acres
as bargaining power and receive higher royalty and rental
rates. After all, the Tribe has the possession of the land
and resources.
With regards to renegotiating leases it should be noted that
the Tribe accomplished this in 1977, when Secretary of the
Interior Cecil Andrus approved a renegotiated lease between
the Navajo Tribe and El Paso-Consol. The new terms of the
lease included a 550/ton or 12-1/2 percent royalty rate (de-
pending on which figure is the highest), and a $5.6 million
advance bonus. A couple of points should be made regarding
the above arrangements. First, the minimum 12-1/2 percent
royalty rate had been standard with public leases and is just
now being considered as a standard regulation change in 25
CFR, 171. The important factor here is that the rate is a
minimum 12-1/2 percent and so why did the Tribe accept the
12-1/2 percent and not renegotiate for 18 percent or even 25
percent? Second, the original lease was signed in 1968 for
a term of ten years and according to the federal regulations.
The renegotiation took place eighteen years after the ori-
ginal lease and eight years past the stated regulations.
There are good legal justifications for the Tribe to evaluate
present coal contracts and decide the grounds for cancellation
or renegotiation. But the challenge for the Tribal Council
will be to develop their guidelines or evaluating reservation
resources in terms that will be in the best interest for the
Tribe. The Tribe maintains the ownership of reservation
natural resources. But ownership is half the battle of con-
trolling one's resources. The other half is developing posi-
tive methods for extracting the resource, if this is the kind
of development the Tribe wants. The realization of ownership
and the bargaining power it develops has not been fully uti-
lized by the Tribal Council or negotiators that represent
the Tribe, and there are several factors the Tribe should
recognize before negotiating coal leases that could provide
a different perspective of ownership and what the development
possibilities of its coal resources really are for the reser-
vation.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT VENTURES
As stated, estimated Navajo potential coal reserves are 8
billion tons. At this time approximately 4 billion tons are
economically recoverable and of that amount 2.6 billion tons
have been leased with some 1.4 billion tons still at the dis-
posal of the Tribe. Total coal production on the reservation
in 1978 was 15,542,028 tons, with about 40 percent of this
production coming from the Four Corners Region of the reser-
vation. Total income for the same year was $3.6 million.
It is estimated by the U.S. Geological Survey that Navajo
coal production in this area will be 15.5 million tons per
year. Given these estimates of coal quantity and production
and present lease arrangements, it becomes more apparent that
time is not on the side of the Tribe. In the renegotiated
lease with El Paso-Consol, the company estimates it will mine
for the next 38 years. If this is an indication of the future
market and with the Tribe only receiving a 12.5 percent roy-
alty rate, then alternative sources for increasing their
revenue should be considered if they expect to implement the
goals of the Ten-Year Plan.
There are several alternatives that could be considered. As
an example, (1) negotiate better contracts, (2) joint ven-
tures, and (3) service contracts. Negotiating contracts
requires the tribal participants to have, if possible, as
much information on their coal reserves, such as quantity,
quality, and marketability. Not to mention the necessary
knowledge of the operations of corporate structures, the
cost of mining and profit margins. To date, all of these
requirements have not been available to the Tribe. Obviously,
before going to a bargaining table, the tribal negotiation
should, at a minimum, know the quantity, quality, and market
value for coal. But as discussed before, the interested
coal company can lease tribal land for exploration, then with
preferential treatment through exclusive permits, they can
enter into direct negotiations after having determined the
extent of the coal reserves. To help alleviate this problem,
the BIA in 1975 developed a Minerals Inventory Program for
the Bureau of Mines and U.S. Geological Survey. The program
is proposed in three phases to:
I. Provide a literature search and summaries
of mineral potential by reservation,
II. Implement field investigations on selected
reservations, those that show mineral poten-
tial determined in Phase I,
III. Determine qualification of occurrence,
quality, grade, metallurgical recovery, and
marketing potential of resources on the
selected reservations.
The drawback to this program is that BIA lacks both qualified
personnel and budget to adequately implement the three
phases. Given the complex budget cycle that the federal gov-
ernment goes through and the cumbersome bureaucratic system,
it is conceivable that it would take years to complete the
program. Unfortunately, time is not on the side of the
Navajos or any other tribe confronting this situation. Two
solutions, though, would be to contract federal funds to the
Navajo Tribe under Public Law 93-638, the Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, and supplemented with some
revenue from existing incoming royalty rates, conduct their
own minerals inventory. The other possibility is to estab-
lish a federal loan program to energy-potential tribes. Has
not this been done in the past with some railroads and air-
plane manufacturers in the United States?
The potential for joint ventures has been discussed among
Tribal Council members in the past, but they have been dis-
couraged by the BIA and the lack of their own knowledge about
the coal industry. Once a coal company has determined the
potential of proven reserves on the reservation, they secure
a lease and develop a working interest to produce the coal,
based on existing equity or they secure a loan from a finan-
cial institution. This is based on the fact that the company
has proven coal resources. Given the fact that the Navajo
Tribe is the owner of these proven resources, what would pre-
vent them from securing a loan on the resources and then the
loan would become their capital contribution in a joint ven-
ture. If the Tribe entered into a joint venture agreement,
they should be aware that in addition to their capital invest-
ment, they would have to establish the capability of monitor-
ing their partner's operations in order to protect Tribal
interests.
The other approach would be to establish a Tribal-owned
enterprise that could produce coal through service contracts.
Like the joint venture possibility, the Tribal Council has
not been encouraged because they lack (1) capital investment,
(2) management capabilities, and (3) a track record of suc-
cessful business ventures. Service contracts are basically
agreements between an owner, in this case the Navajo Tribe,
and experienced companies. The Tribe as possessor of the
coal could contract to a mining company to extract the coal
and then a Tribal mineral developing company could market the
product. Comparing this to alternatives that developing
countries are taking, Charles Lipton stated:
"that mineral agreements have taken a 180 degree
turn since World War II. No longer will any
developing countryaccept a fixed royalty of
a few cents per ton as its share of the revenues
from a mineral project. Royalties are usually
a percentage of the value of the mineral mined.
Increasingly, through joint venture agreements,
developing countries are keeping a major share
of the profits as shareholders in the mining
operating company as well as taxing profits.
Some developing countries have now decided to
go into minint projects themselves and hire
mining companies under service contracts to
mine and market the minerals on a fixed fee
basis, thus retaining complete ownership, com-
plete control and 100% of the profits.. Others
hire mining companies to be managers, paying
them a percentage of the profits."16
As indicated before, the capital investment capability
exists in the form of the Tribe's proven coal reserves. It
is estimated that there are 4 billion tons of coal under 500
square miles in the Four Corners Region and with this amount
of coal resources available as potential capital investment,
the Tribe could develop its own financial package and pre-
sent it to any investment bank to develop the necessary
capital required to start a Navajo coal enterprise or joint
venture with an existing coal corporation. The Tribe pre-
sently may not have qualified management skills available,
but if it decided to develop its coal enterprise there is no
reason why it could not contract this specialty to an off-
reservation firm. These contracts could be for short periods
of seven to ten years and would be advantageous for a Tribal
enterprise because, in addition to the management obligations
of the industry, the contracted company would have to imple-
ment an educational and training program for Navajos with
management capabilities. If it became necessary to renew a
management contract, then one aspect in reviewing the success
of the existing management company could be measured on the
number of successful Navajo candidates who were trained. This
approach of direct Navajo involvement has proven successful
on the reservation before in one Tribal enterprise, as indi-
cated in Chapter II: with Navajo Forest Products Industries,
which has an extensive training program and has developed
an excellent track record as a successful Tribal business
venture.
PROPOSED COAL GASIFICATION INDUSTRY -- PRESENT STATUS
In the following illustration, the main focus will be on
Tribal control over the proposed coal gasification plants.
The issues confronting the Tribe are similar to the strip
mining illustration in that:
-- the Tribe is dealing with off-reservation corpora-
tions;
-- capital investments are required;
-- increase in employment opportunities;
-- impacts on the socio-economic, cultural and
environment of the reservation.
The differences are:
-- the gasification industry is more labor intensive
than strip mining, resulting in more management
control and increased population;
-- higher capital investment to start the industry,
approximately $600 million/plant;
-- increased demand for surface water to operate each
plant;
-- the process of granting business site leases and
land tenureship.
Because of these differences the Tribal Council should alter
their negotiating approach to this development and consider
64
alternatives to increasing their control over this develop-
ment. It is the objective of this illustration to explore
and provide alternatives in the areas of: (1) Tribal involve-
ment through joint ventures, (2) leasing of reservation land
for business site leases, and (3) securing better employment
agreements.
In addition to the existing electrical power plants and coal
stripmining in the Four Corners Region, there are proposals
to construct as many as six coal gasification plants. All
are planned within a 56-mile radius of the Four Corners area
and situated on the Navajo Reservation. Two of the plants
are proposed by El Paso Natural Gas Company (EPNG) and four
more by a consortium of corporations called Western Gasifica-
tion Company (WESCO).
The location of the proposed plant sites are situated in a
very arid (less than 8 inches of rain annually) region and
the population is very low (average Reservation density is
one Navajo for every 132 acres) compared with the rest of
the Reservation. The soil conditions are extremely poor,
because of the lack of water and the over-grazing by the
sheep herds. (It takes about 25 acres to feed one sheep.)
Near the coal site, within a radius of 35 miles are two growth
centers, Shiprock, New Mexico, which is on the Reservation
65
and Farmington, New Mexico, which is located just off the
Reservation. The companies proposing the plants plan to
build the six gasification plants during a ten-year period,
and each plant would employ approximately 900 individuals,
resulting in a total of 5,400 jobs. Adjacent to the coal
fields, there is in process a multi-million dollar irrigation
program that will divert water from the San Juan River to
eventually irrigate 110,000 acres of arid land on the Reser-
vation. The irrigation project will employ another 3,000
individuals, making over 9,000 jobs available in the near
future. Estimating 4.5 people per family, this area in the
next ten years will have an increased population of 40,500.
In addition the gasification plants will each require approxi-
mately 10,000 acre feet/year of water, creating an increased
demand on surface water in the area.
Presently there are no coal gasification plants located in
the United States. Consequently, the long-range socioeconomic
and sociocultural impacts that this industry will have on
the Reservation is in a state of speculation.
As mentioned in this Chapter, coal leases between Utah Inter-
national, El Paso-Consol and the Navajo Tribe have been
approved. To date, no coal gasification plant proposals have
been accepted by the Tribal Council. But in light of the
recent national energy crisis and President Carter's energy
proposal, the Tribal Council can be assured that interested
corporations will be presenting renewed proposals in the
near future for coal gasification plants.
Gasification plant requirements. All six proposed plants are
approximately the same size and each will require teh follow-
ing:
1. Cost @ $400-600 million/plant
2. 1,000 acres of land/plant site
3. 9 million tons of coal/year/plant
4. 10,000 acre feet of water/year/plant
5. Employment -- construction phase, approximately
4,500 employees/plant @ peak of activity,
leveling off to 900 permanent employees/plant
6. 25-year lease/plant
At this time the Western Gasification Company (WESCO) will
be supplied with coal and water from Utah International's
existing stripmining project and secured water rights of
44,000 acre feet for industrial purposes. El Paso has rene-
gotiated a coal lease with the Navajo Tribe for 40,000 acres,
but has not been granted its request of 28,250 acre feet of
water annually, from the Bureau of Reclamation. Neither
of the two proposals have received a business site lease,
which is required by the Tribal Council.
Because the process of coal gasification is a new industrial
venture in the United States, most of the requirements for
establishing the industry's production and marketing are
still proposed projections. Realistically, the demands,
cost/benefits and output of this industry will not be fully
proven until a gasification plant is constructed. This
places the Navajo Tribe at a disadvantage, because in the
negotiations the Tribe will be dealing with an industry that
has not fully established the gasification process and whose
facts and statistics the Tribal Council will have to rely on
to provide adequate information about the requirements and
projections of this industrial process. Given this situation,
Tribal negotiators should only accept information provided by
the proposed industry, as minimum data and keep in mind that
the projected input and output of this industry could be
distorted through the lack of an established, proven process.
Therefore, it could have greater impact on the human and
natural resources of the Reservation.
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS -- COAL GASIFICATION INDUSTRY
Parallel to the stripmining leases, Tribal negotiators should
be aware of advantages and trade-offs that the Navajo Tribe
will have to consider and confront, if they are to fully par-
ticipate in the development of the coal gasification industry
on the Reservation. As mentioned above, there are similar
negotiating issues confronting the Tribal Council's review of
land and coal leasing for strip mining and the proposed gasi-
fication industry.
First, both industries depend on the common resource of coal.
Realizing that the Navajo Tribe owns the resource, the Tribal
Council should recognize the bargaining power and develop
this resource as collateral which could be presented as a
financial package. In turn, this package becomes the Tribe's
capital investment power and opens the possibilities for
ownership through joint venture into the gasification indus-
try. This does not preclude the formation of a Tribal enter-
prise that would retain sole ownership, but again emphasizing
the newness of the industry and lack of Tribal management
expertise, it is recommended that the Tribal Council view
this venture on a long-term basis. Given adequate time, the
Tribe could increase its percentage of joint venture owner-
ship through increased profits, which would be reinvested
into the industry. The important factor to remember is that
the Navajo Tribe is owner of the coal resource that the two
industries are dependent upon for their existence. The strip
mining and gasification industries may be highly qualified to
invest capital and provide the necessary technology, but the
Navajo Tribe maintains the ownership of the coal resource,
which is the key to this industrial process. Through the
joint venture approach, the Tribe would eliminate the royalty
payment system. Presently, the only income that the Tribe
would derive from the gasification proposal is the sale of
the coal and rental payment on the lease-hold agreement for
land required to build the gasification plant. If the Tribe
becomes involved in the complete industrial process, their
profit sharing of the end product (natural gas) would by far
exceed any income based on a royalty fee.
Second, it should be recognized that the proposed sites for
construction of the plants are located within the boundary
of the Reservation. This situation also has potential for
developing additional revenue for the Tribe. Traditionally,
Navajo land tenure has been of common ownership by all mem-
bers of the Tribe, and reservation land cannot be sold
because it is held in trust by the federal government. To
date, this has generally worked well for the individual
Navajo, because the Reservation has not been sub-divided into
tracts of land for individual or family ownership. The
appraisal of reservation land does not have any identifica-
tion with the conventional approach of attaching a monetary
value on real estate. Although the traditional aspects are
well respected, it creates problems in land development,
especially concerning rental payments on appraisal of reser-
vation land for coal leasing and industrial site lease-hold
agreements.
It has been customary for the federal government to establish
the value of Indian land and thus determine the going rental
rate that Indian tribes should receive for the use of their
land by private industries. Because of the federal govern-
ment's close identification of Indian land to public land,
they have established their tradition of appraising both
public and Indian lands at the lowest possible minimum rental
rate of 250 and $1.00 per acre, respectively. This applies
to land that is used for coal strip mining purposes and the
Tribe received an initial bid per acre of $6.25 from EPNG
for their lease of 40,000 acres to be strip mined. Given
the method of the federal government evaluation of Indian
land, it would not be surprising if they recommended to the
Navajo Tribe that they accept a rental of $6.25 per acre,
annually, for a gasification plant site lease. This would
mean that under the present situation, the Navajo Tribe
would have an annual income based on the royalty rate of
mined coal and annual rental fee of $6,250.00 per plant site
lease (considering each plant site requires 1,000 acres).
Also, past rental contracts have been written with a fixed
fee and if this prevailed, the Tribe would receive the same
annual amount of rental income for the life of the project.
Of course this is based on past experience of federal land
evaluation. It is highly recommended that the Navajo Tribe
establish their criteria for land appraisal, especially with
regard to reservation land that is used for industrial pur-
poses. The notion of creating a monetary value on reserva-
tion industrial land will provide extra leverage for the
Tribe's bargaining power in negotiating lease-hold agreements
for the construction of gasification plants.
There are several approaches the Tribe could take in estab-
lishing their land evaluation criteria:
1) Given that each gasification plant will require
approximately 1,000 acres, Tribal appraisers
should investigate what the current cost of
industrial land is in the neighboring cities
and states.
2) Compare a cost analysis of construction, employ-
ment, real estate value and evalute the advan-
tages/disadvantages and trade-offs that a
gasification plant would have to consider in
locating on or adjacent to the reservation.
3) Establish a land value on:
a) Percentage of the final construction cost
of one coal gasification plant and
re-evaluated every year because of esca-
lation cost and appreciation of land
value, or
b) Comparable current industrial land value
off the reservation with an inflationary
clause.
After the criterion is developed and value of reservation
land is established, the negotiation options for the Tribe
will become increasingly evident. As an example, if the
Tribe applied a 10 percent land value based upon an indus-
trial investment of 600 million dollars for a gasification
plant, then the site of 1,000 acres appraisal will be
worth a minimum of 6 million dollars. Multiplying this
times 6 plant sites will equal a 36-million-dollar evalua-
tion, and if the Tribe imposes an escalation clause for re-
evaluation every year, then the appreciation of the land
will increase the value of the sites. Usually after a land
value has been established, assessment for'tax purposes
follows.
The tax situation is going to become an increasing conflict
between the states of Utah, Arizona, New Mexico and the
reservation. Because the reservation extends into these
three states, they support the argument that would ensure
them the capability of levying a land tax on those industries
located within the boundaries of the reservation. This would
virtually add millions of dollars annually to these states.
These states feel they have the right to this revenue regard-
less of the fact that they will not be paying the cost of
support services required to establish the coal and gasifica-
tion industries. Among these support services would be an
infrastructure of utilities, water, sewer and transportation,
and last but not least, the use of Navajo coal, water and
expense of land reclamation. It is ironic and the height of
exploitation for these states to assume that they have the
right to collect tax revenue from reservation industries
without economically or socially contributing to the estab-
lishment and support of these industries. The Tribal argument
could be stated very clearly. Noting that the reservation is
land held in trust by the federal government and that states
cannot legally tax the federal government, then on what legal
grounds can they impose a land tax on the reservation? To
counteract this movement, the Tribal Council should be able
to develop a reservation industrial business tax.
Third, the employment impact of this proposed industry will
have a greater effect on the reservation than any existing
industry. This impact will have noted differences in (1) the
types of jobs offered, (2) job skills required, (3) migration
of Navajo and non-Navajo employees, and (4) multiplier effects
through additional employment created by the gasification
industry. But in accordance with the variety of skilled and
unskilled requirements that the gasification industry brings
into the region, the serious issue confronting the Navajo
Tribe is who will obtain the employment.
There is no doubt that this form of industry will create an
immediate job market for the construction phase of the gasi-
fication plants and sustain its pace for the life of opera-
ting the plants. The basic employment assumptions presented
by El Paso Natural Gas Company indicate that for the con-
struction of one plant, a peak work force of 4,535 will be
required. This peak will have a time span of only two
years. The assumption is that the construction phase of
the first plant will be near completion at this time and
preparation of the second plant initiated. This time cycle
will continue for ten years after which all six gasification
plants are scheduled to be in full production. New Mexico
State Employment Service has indicated that there is a
shortage of eligible construction skilled and unskilled
workers in the area. Therefore, it is estimated that only
200 skilled and 500 unskilled construction workers from the
local region will be hired for construction of the plants.
This would result in an immigration of workers to fulfill
the construction requirements. Hence, 95 percent of the
maximum skilled and 45 percent of the maximum unskilled
number of workers required would come from outside the region.
This problem is defined on the basis of constructing one
plant and if WESCO's construction phase coincides with EPNG's
plans, then the overall problem of worker shortage and in-
migration of workers will be compounded.
After construction, the gasification plants will maintain an
average of 900 permanent workers per plant. The total number
could reach 1,500, as indicated by El Paso Natural Gas
figures. El Paso Natural Gas Company has proposed a train-
ing program, but still suggests that an estimate of only
1,000, or one-third of the operating workers, will be
employed from within the region and 2,000, or about two-
thirds of the personnel, will be imported.18 This actual
employment created through the construction of the plants
and operations of the gasification process are referred to
as direct employment. In addition to this form of employ-
ment, the establishment of indirect jobs created through a
multiplier effect will contribute to an increment of
employment potential in the region, and if these support jobs
cannot be filled from within the region, the influx of indi-
viduals seeking employment will take place. This indirect
employment will mostly consist of support services for the
basic industries and will involve commercial, retail and
wholesale businesses.
Regardless of the numbers presented for potential direct and
indirect jobs that will be created due to the establishment
of gasification plants, the fact remains that Navajos will
have to compete for both skilled and unskilled positions
without having adequate labor trained for the requirements
of the coal and coal gasification industries. Although the
Navajo tribe is negotiating for better guarantees concerning
the hiring of Navajo workers, it is important to note two
elements: (1) existing qualifications of skilled and un-
skilled Navajo labor force and (2) the time scale concerning
the construction and production of the proposed gasification
industry. If the plants are constructed according to the
proposed time scale, many Navajos will not be able to take
advantage of the job market. The construction proposal is
based on plant completion of approximately every three years
with overlapping construction schedules as one plant is near
completion and new construction begins on the next plant.
The complete construction cycle of this process will take
almost ten years. Realistic or not, this represents a
construction venture that could overwhelm the Navajo labor
force once this rapid succession of construction came to an
end. Construction work is noted for its irregularities in
that it is seasonal employment, has a high turnover rate and
unless the local economic situation can sustain the market,
the construction worker has to move on to the next oppor-
tunity for employment.
The situation created by the construction of the gasification
plants will definitely have an atmosphere of rapid economic
expansion. But after the construction phase, what happens
to the Navajo labor force? Although the Navajo labor force
will be able to take advantage of the gasification plant
construction phase, the ultimate alternative objective should
include employment opportunities for Navajos that precede
the construction phase. Both the Navajo tribe and gasifica-
tion industries are considering training programs to assist
Navajos in obtaining various skills that would enable them
to compete in the given job market. This appears to be a
positive proposal, but it could have long-term negative
effects for the Navajo involved. For several years the BIA
has promoted vocational training programs that emphasized
skills such as welders, pipe fitters, electricians, carpenters,
etc., but once the participant returned to the reservation,
his skill often did not coincide with jobs available. So if
the tribe and gas industries pursue the training proposals,
it should not only include the actual training of a skill,
but the program should develop a placement system that would
enable the Navajo worker a transitional phase of adapting
his skill to the requirements of the operational activities
of the gasification plants. Because of the social/cultural
identification to the reservation, many Navajos are reluctant
to leave in search of employment. Therefore, if this train-
ing program was instituted, it would satisfy the individual
Navajo's desire to remain on the reservation, and assist the
tribal need of sustaining its employment demands on both
short- and long-term bases.
SUMMARY
There exist serious problems of coal exploitation on the
reservation that challenge the inherent right of the Navajo
Tribe, as owner of this resource, to become directly involved
in the extraction and marketing of this product. If the
Tribe's development objectives are to increase the income
of the Navajos by attracting industry to the reservation,
then they should become fully aware of the potential of such
industry in supplying the needed employment. If the industry
does prove to be capital intensive as opposed to labor inten-
sive, the Tribal Council should develop alternatives of shar-
ing in the return of profits from the marketability of the
product. In terms of responsibility, this would require
higher risks for the Tribe because they would be sole owner
or partner in any business venture involving coal production.
By using their proven coal reserves as investment capital,
the Tribe could develop a coal enterprise or joint venture.
Either way, their investment would return as profits and not
through rental of land and royalty rates. This approach could
also permit the Tribe to employ a management firm with a
training program, for Navajos, until the Tribe could assume
full responsibility for their enterprise. Before any of
this process can take place, the Tribal Council will have
to re-evaluate their present status in relationship to their
needs and demands.
Because of the loose requirements and lack of enforcing
mining regulations, the federal government has placed the
Tribe at a disadvantage when negotiating contracts, and
because of federal discrepancies in promoting Tribal coal
leases, the Tribal Council has sufficient legal recourse to
negotiate the contracts. Therefore, the Council should
establish an Office of Contract Negotiations that would
coordinate the development objectives of the Navajo Nation.
The office would be responsible for mineral, oil and natural
gas contracts and the contracting of professional negotiating
teams with an expertise in dealing with corporate structures
on related natural resources. In addition, the office would
participate as a team member to make sure reservation objec-
tives are complied with during the negotiation of contracts.
The possibility of ownership of a coal company or gasifica-
tion plant appears to be a way for obtaining more income.
But because of the large costs the tribe would have to incur
and their limited investment power (equity), they should
consider this possibility as a long-term process of gaining
economic control of their resources. One key is in the
negotiations for the business site lease. The contracts for
coal are signed but open for negotiations. Additional poten-
tial for income exists in the leasehold agreement of the
proposed gasification business sites. In addition to pro-
fiting from the sale of the gas, the tribe shouldraise the
cost of the lease-hold to a level that would justifiably
increase their income by a larger margin. For years the
tribe has recognized the profits that could be made from the
sale of natural resources, but they have not realized the
reserves of income that could be generated by using the land
as real estate. By establishing a high cost of land for
industrial leasing, the tribe could invest this revenue and
use the profits to build their own coal companies, gasifica-
tion plants, power plants, etc. In this particular case
the land is their greatest bargaining asset.
As mentioned earlier, six gasification plants are proposed
to be constructed and the tribe should think about owning at
least several of the plants. This could possibly be done by
the following way: (1) Raise the leasehold cost to provide
a better income; (2) after the first lease is signed, use
the second lease as bargaining power, by lowering the cost
of the leasehold in exchange for profits derived from the
sale of the natural gas; (3) with the third lease negotiate
an exchange of lower leasehold costs for part-ownership in
the gasification plant, backed up with equity (investment
power) that was made through investments from profits of the
two previous lease agreements; (4) each time a leasehold
agreement is signed, the tribe should gain a higher percen-
tage of ownership until finally they have enough experience
and equity to completely own several gasification plants.
Since employment is a major goal of the Tribal Council, they
should recognize the fact that many of tje jobs created by
the establishment of a gasification plant are jobs requiring
highly skilled technicians. Consequently, many of these
jobs will go to non-Navajos and would delay the employment
goal established by the Council. Again, realizing the
product of coal and acquisition of land as a bargaining
power, the Council could ensure Navajo employment by stipu-
lating a training program to educate Navajos as skilled
technicians and managers. These programs could be jointly
sponsored by the tribe and gas companies as part of the
agreement when the lease-hold contracts are negotiated.
This training would not only guarantee a higher percentage
of Navajo participation in the gasification plants, but
would prepare Navajos for total control over future ownership
of gas plants, coal mining operations, etc.
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CHAPTER III
IMPACTS OF COAL DEVELOPMENT
"An attitude to life which seeks fulfillment in
the single-minded pursuit of wealth -- in short,
materialism -- does not fit into this world,
because it contains within itself no limiting
principle, while the environment in which it is
placed is strictly limited. Already, the envi-
ronment is trying to tell us that certain stresses
are becoming excessive. As one problem is being
'solved,' ten new problems arise as a result of
the first 'solution."'l
As the Navajo Tribal Council strives to improve the economic
conditions on the reservation for their people, the planning
process should carefully consider the trade-offs and pitfalls
that will challenge the growth and control of the Tribe's
self-determination goal.
The development of coal in the Four Corners Region of the
reservation in the past 20 years has changed dramatically.
Once an ample supply of coal was proven and contracted for
mining the product, this portion of the reservation became,
to outside investors and industrialists, an economic blossom
in the desert. To date, in addition to coal mining, there
are two electrical generating power plants -- the Four
Corners Plant, located on the reservation, and the San Juan
Plant, located just off the reservation in New Mexico.
Proposals for as many as six coal gasification plants have
been presented to the Navajo Tribal Council for approval.
Although these proposals were rejected by the Tribal Council
in January 1978, revised proposals are being prepared for the
Council's reconsideration.
The impacts this industrialization will have upon the reser-
vation occur in the following areas: (1) water resources,
(2) environmental, and (3) new community development. In the
Southwest portion of the United States, water is the keystone
for future development. Indian water rights, which are criti-
cally important to energy resource development both on and off
Indian land, are of great concern to Indian leaders. This
concern has evolved over the allocation of this precious
resource, and the Indian people fear that the allocation of
Indian water rights has taken place without the Indian
owners' permission. Obviously, this becomes a real problem
when tribes are trying to develop their reservations. Envi-
ronmental impacts already exist concerning sulfur emissions
created by the electrical power plants. But, in addition,
the Navajos are confronted with land reclamation of coal-
mined areas. Although there are reclamation laws to persuade
mining companies to reclaim strip-mined areas, in this por-
tion of the reservation there is a delicate balance of the
ecological system, and the question of possible reclamation
has not proven feasible. With the establisment of an indus-
trial base, the spin-offs will increase in several areas.
One will be in the area of employment opportunities, and
this has an impact on new community development within the
boundaries of the reservation. This will require the Tribal
Council to give serious consideration to various issues such
as jurisdiction over non-Navajos on the reservation, land
tenureship, development and cost of social amenities such as
health, education, transportation, etc. Foremost, the Tribe
must evaluate the impact on the Navajo culture and society
that any kind of development will create.
This chapter discusses these three direct impacts and their
possible repercussions as a result of industrial development
on the reservation. When development goals and strategies
for implementation are established, Tribal decisionmakers
should review a comprehensive development plan carefully,
bearing in mind the consequences of the "trade-offs" in the
Plan and compromises that they must make before they estab-
lish a policy.
Water Resources: As mentioned earlier, water is the key-
stone to development in the Four Corners Region. The issue
is more than having an adequate supply of water to meet
the demands, and becomes increasingly complicated because of
the question of ownership of water rights. In 1908, the
Supreme Court essentially declared in the landmark Winters
vs. United States water case that when Indian reservations
were organized, there was reserved or affirmed in addition to
land the right to enough water to irrigate the irrigable por-
tions of the reservation lands and otherwise fulfill the
purposes of future reservation development.2 The main source
of water in this region is the San Juan River, which is part
of the Colorado River Basin. The U.S. Congress possesses the
rights over water in interstate commerce. In turn, an inter-
state commerce commission within respective states regulates
control over water in a particular water basin. The dispute
that exists is whether allocation of water should be separate
from the competing state. Obviously, the Indian tribes think
that, based on the Winters Doctrine, their allocations should
be considered separately. But to date, both state and
federal agencies, for the most part, have continued to allo-
cate all water, ignoring Indian interests.
The present and proposed water allocation for projects
located on the Navajo reservation is as follows:
Acre feet/year
(Af/yr)
1. Utah International 44,000
2. Navajo Indian Irrigation 508,000
Project
Acre feet/year
3. Four Corners Power Plant
Proposed (requested):
1. Western Gasification
Company (WESCO)
a) Four coal gasification
plants @ 10,000 Af/yr
2. El Paso Natural Gas*
TOTAL
51,600
40,000
20,000
713,600
*El Paso has requested
28,250 Af/yr
It should be noted that these figures are forecasting ulti-
mate use and will eventually represent a depletion of the
annual flow of surface water from the San Juan River.
In a BIA 1975 report, the annual depletion rate of the San
Juan River was as follows:
Acre feet/year
1. Average Natural Streamflow 1,549,000
2. Depletions (1973)
a) Indian
b) Non-Indian
99,630 Af/yr
344,350 Af/yr
TOTAL 443,980
(including agriculture, municipal,
stock and domestic, exports, indus-
trial and evaporation)
Acre feet/year
3. Depletions from Authorized
Projects
(such as Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project)
TOTAL 554,070
4. Remaining streamflow 550,950
5. Potential Indian water
projects
(including Navajo, Jicarilla-
Apache, Southern Ute, Ute
Mountain)
TOTAL 2,890,260
The main purpose of the above examples of water requests and
depletion rates is to emphasize the expanding demand for
water in the growth and development of the region. In addi-
tion, the Navajo Tribe is increasingly concerned about its
water rights and its control over existing allocated water.
The Tribe's Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP) illus-
trates this concern. In 1962, President Kennedy signed the
Navajo Tribal Council Public Law 87-483, authorizing the
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project. This irrigation project
was proposed to cultivate 110,630 acres of Navajo land at a
cost of $135 million, with an annual water allocation of
508,000 acre feet per year. Since the law was signed, the
Bureau of Reclamation and state agencies have taken several
actions that have reduced the initial 508,000 acre feet per
year allocation to 330,000 acre feet per year because the
irrigation system was changed to support sprinklers instead
of a flood (open ditch) system. The created surplus of
178,000 acre feet/year would revert back to the state of New
Mexico to be sold to other proposed projects. This issue
has not been resolved and the Tribe's concern is that Con-
gress allocated 508,000 acre feet/year and the Tribe's con-
tention is that they have the right to handle the surplus
of 178,000 acre feet/year as it sees fit. This is definitely
a challenge to the concept of Navajo sovereignty; until
Indian tribes successfully challenge the federal and state
agencies, they will be confronted with this issue.
Consequently, in considering the proposed development of the
Four Corners Region, the Tribe will have to evaluate the
over-allocation of their water resources and the constant
challenge to their inherent sovereignty.
Environmental: In addition to the sulfur dioxide emission
from the two power plants in the area, the after-effects of
strip mining will increase the damage to the environment.
Strip mining is a process that requires the removal of
over-burdened topsoil before the coal seams are exposed and
mined. Because the mining process requires the following of
coal seams, the results after the coal has been removed are
open trenches with huge heaps of overburdened soil that
stretch for miles. In the Four Corners Region the trenches
are usually about 150 feet deep.
Currently, before the actual mining starts, a reclamation
plan must be approved by the Area Mining Supervisor of the
U.S. Geological Survey with approval from the Navajo Tribe
and the BIA. As stated in the renegotiated lease between
the Navajo Tribe and El Paso-Consol,
"An integral part of the plans for the leasehold
include the specific reclamation of strip-mined
or disturbed lands. The lessee is required to
return the reclaimed land to grazing uses with a
productivity equal to or greater than that of
comparable undisturbed land in the immediate
area. To this end the mined lands will be back-
filled and graded to the approximate original
contour, earth materials will be compacted over
each coal bed, and the lands resurfaced with
soil, conditioned, seeded, and supplementally
irrigated at appropriate times. Provision is 4
made in lease terms for alternative land use."
Given the fact that there are two mining leases, as des-
cribed in Chapter II, for a combined acreage of 71,703, the
effects on the area's environment will be astonishing. To
date, the possibility of rehabilitation has not been proven.
In addition to the adequate soil conditions required for
reclamation, adequate water is the main factor in any pro-
posed rehabilitation plan. There are two factors confronting
any proposed plan to reclaim the land in this portion of the
reservation: (1) water supply (both rainfall and surface
water) and (2) cost to rehabilitate. First, the average
annual rainfall in the Four Corners Region is less than 10
inches and according to the National Academy of Sciences
report,
"The drier areas, those receiving less than ten
inches of annual rainfall or with high evapora-
tion rates, pose a more difficult problem. Re-
vegetation of these areas can probably be accom-
plished only with major, sustained inputs of
water, fertilizer, and management," and, "Rehab-
ilitation of the drier sites may occur naturally
on a time scale that is unacceptable to society,
because it may take decades, or even centuries 5for natural succession to reach stable conditions."
Second, the cost to rehabilitate one acre of land ranges from
$925 to $2,750.6 Using the low figure and existing acreage
under lease, it would cost approximately $66.3 million to
rehabilitate this land. Third, it is estimated that rehabi-
litation of land in this area would require .5 to .75 acre
feet/acre. At this rate, and considering only the existing
leases, it would require a conservative allocation of water
for supplemental irrigation of between 35,850 to 53,777
acre feet to reclaim the stripped area. Considering the
existing and proposed water allocations from the San Juan
River, any additional proposal for rehabilitation would have
to compete with these demands.
With the demand for water increasing on a national level,
President Carter's water policy is proposing quantification
of water resources.8 If this policy is implemented, the
Navajo Tribe will have to justify its use of water, including
agriculture, livestock grazing, consumption, industrial, etc.
The Tribal Council is proposing that strip-mined areas be
rehabilitated so that Navajo livestock can graze once again
in this area. If the Tribe has to quantify its water needs
for the future, then they should include the strip-mined area
as land that would be rehabilitated for the purpose of agri-
culture as well as livestock. With the Navajo Irrigation
Project located in the same area, it could be expanded to
include the reclaimed area and could justify the "surplus"
of 178,000 acre feet mentioned in the above section on water
impacts, and any additional water required to place and sus-
tain rehabilitated land for agricultural purposes.
New Community Development: Typically, large-scale energy
development projects proceed rapidly with little preparation
for the needs of the construction and operation workers immi-
grating for the projects. There is a strong possibility that
quick housing, such as mobile home parks, would be created
-- only to become a slum area later. Educational facilities
become overcrowded or established, roads, sewer and water
lines are often inadequate, retail and recreational facilities
cannot be constructed fast enough to meet the rapidly expand-
ing needs. Considering the existing and proposed projects in
the Four Corners Region and realizing that the area is basic-
ally rural, the proposed coal projects will have severe
fiscal and social impacts on the region.
Although the Tribal Council is not proposing any new communi-
ties as a result of additional strip mining, electrical power
plants or proposed coal gasification plants, the potential
does exist. To date, the impacts of current development
have been absorbed both on and off the reservation by the
existing communities of Shiprock (on the reservation),
Farmington, Fruitland, Kirtland and others in the area. But
the proposed coal gasification projects will have the great-
est impact by far on this region, if the projects are ap-
proved by the Tribal Council.
As discussed in Chapter II, the gasification projects are
proposed by El Paso Natural Gas Company (two projects) and
Western Gasification Company (four projects). It has been
projected that once the gasification projects are in opera-
tion (10-year construction cycle), a new town in this area
with a population of 32,000 would exist.9 Considering a
multiplier effect, the population could expand to 60,000
by the year 2000.10
The construction of each plant will take about three years
and require 3,500 construction employees for each plant at
its respective construction peak. It is estimated that
with overlapping construction phases, the six plants will be
in full operation in 10 years.12 Thus, whether or not the
Tribal Council approves any plans for a new town proposal,
the impact of the construction phase will affect the reser-
vation.
The development of these projects will have a broad impact
on the socio-economic, cultural, and political aspects of
reservation life-style. The average personal income of
gasification employees will be about $10,000, compared with
the present personal Navajo income of $900.13 The demand
for community infrastructures will increase, such as housing,
education and health facilities, and transportation. It
should be noted that some of these impacts already are being
experienced by some Navajos. But the accelerated development
process, as indicated by the gasification projects, will
create a relatively short transition for reservation devel-
opment, and it is this transition that will have the greatest
adverse effect on Navajo culture. For generations the
Navajos have had the ability to adjust gradually to outside
influences. Geographic location and maintenance of their
language contributed to a steady transition into the present
day. With these proposals for development, challenges to
Navajo sovereignty will occur. These challenges will con-
front issues of jurisdiction of Navajo Tribal policies over
non-Navajos living on the reservation, for instance, law-and-
order cases involving non-Navajos and the fact that in the
existing Tribal government, only Navajos have representation.
These issues have not been resolved, but will be impacts that
Tribal decisionmakers will have to investigate.
The Tribal Council has alternatives. First, they could
refuse to accept any proposals for new community development
and simply allow the off-reservation border towns to absorb
the development impacts. Second, they still own the coal
resources, and it is these resources that will supply the
gasification plants for the conversion to synthetic fuels.
Consequently, it would be feasible to control the construc-
tion of these plants and ease the impacts over a longer
period. This would alleviate the overall impacts on the
entire region both on and off the reservation.
These three major impacts -- water, environmental and new
communities -- cannot be viewed as separate entities within
the overall development process. Without the necessary
water, no additional development will occur. Tribal water
rights are being constantly challenged, and the Tribal water
needs may have to be quantified. By combining development
efforts, future additional water allocation could be justi-
fied by expanding the existing Navajo Irrigation Project to
include the irrigation and rehabilitation of strip-mined
areas. A direct impact of this development will be an
immigration of Navajo and non-Navajo workers. Whether or
not a new town evolves on a permanent basis, construction
of the coal gasification plants will have an impact on the
existing reservation life-style. But included in the devel-
opment process, the Tribal Council should not lose control,
because the Navajo Tribe owns the most important development
factors, the coal and water.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
"If the Great Spirit had desired me to
be a whiteman, He would have made me so
in the first place. Each man is good in
His sight. It is not necessary for eagles
to be crows."
Chief Sitting Bull
(1834 - 1890)
The Navajo Reservation is in the preliminary stages of an
incredible transition of cultural and socio-economic devel-
opment. This development is heavily influenced through the
dominant intervention of the federal government and private
industry, and the impacts will be felt at all levels of
Navajo society on the reservation. The impacts of this
transitional period, which threaten the core of Navajo
society, can be defended against if the Navajo people demand
their unquestionable rights to maintain a role of self-
determination through acts of self-control. But without
developing comprehensive objectives and methods for imple-
menting future development, the terms expressing self-
control are mere rhetoric.
Although there are a variety of development aspects to con-
sider when confronting the future of the Navajo Reservation,
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basic fundamental internal reservation structures can be
developed or improved to express methods of implementing
future planning as planning for Navajos, by Navajos.
SUMMARY
The Navajo Tribal Council has developed a ten-year plan to
create an economy within the boundaries of the reservation
that will provide the Navajo people with a choice of life-
style and a planning process that ensures Navajo control
through a process of self-determination. The goal of the
Plan is to increase employment on the reservation by creating
46,000 new jobs. To achieve this, the Plan identifies areas
within reservation development where capital investment from
both the public and private sectors will contribute approxi-
mately $4 billion.
The concept of the Plan is first to increase and strengthen
the social overhead investment, such as housing, health,
education, labor, transportation, etc. Second, by develop-
ing their natural resources, they would like to create
incentives for further industrial and commercial development.
With apparently abundant natural resources, the Tribal
Council has decided that the increased development of coal
will serve as a key incentive for off-reservation investors
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to commit their capital and assist in achieving the ten-
year plan objectives. This approach is logical, given the
amount of coal resources (approximately 4 billion tons,
which is economically and technologically strippable),
and the available Navajo labor force. But are these factors
sufficient to accomplish the objective of self-determination?
Unfortunately, the Tribe is in a vulnerable position because,
like developing countries, they do not control the market,
and consequently can be exploited to the benefit of the
investor.
Considering the Tribe's ability to control and implement
reservation development, the Tribal Council should review
existing and past economic ventures with these controlling
factors in mind: (1) management, (2) employment (hiring
process, training, etc.), and (3) marketing. As mentioned
in Chapter I, the tribe in 1965 invested capital and labor
to support an electronics firm (Fairchild Camera and Instru-
ment Corporation) located on the reservation. But only ten
years later, the firm which had employed 1,200 Navajos,
shut down its operations and terminated its contract with
the Navajo Tribe. The contract with Fairchild provided no
Navajos in top management positions. In fact, all manage-
ment was controlled from the parent corporation, which was
located off the reservation. Employment was also controlled
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through the non-Navajo plant managers. Their training pro-
gram was subsidized by the BIA, but was not monitored appro-
priately, and training period for employees became very
lax. The only product being provided was semiconductors,
under contract to the federal government. When this market
began to diminish in 1974, the impact on the Fairchild plant
caused them to release Navajo employees. Consequently in
1975 the plant closed its operations.
On the other hand, in 1959 the Tribal Council established a
lumber enterprise, Navajo Forest Products Industries (NFPI),
and over a 20-year period has demonstrated that the Navajos
are capable of controlling their own affairs. The enter-
prise's management board, located on the reservation, is
comprised of both Navajo and non-Navajo members; the Tribal
Council monitors its activities. The existing employment
training program has provided adequate training for Navajo
workers, although, as discussed on pages 19-32, both of
these functions could be improved. The lumber produced by
the industry can be used for local demands as well as for
alternative markets off the -reservation, such as construc-
tion, furniture manufacturing, and lumber stores. Thus,
despite external influences on the reservation and their
consequences, examples such as the Forest Products Industries
illustrate the Navajo's ability to develop a process of
105
controlling their own affairs.
Because of the demand for alternative energy resources, the
Tribal Council realizes that one of the more lucrative ven-
tures is in coal production. The pressure from the federal
establishment and private industry is growing not only to
increase coal production, but also to accept proposals for
the establishment of a synthetic fuel industry, such as
coal gasification.
Chapter II discussed two examples that increased the Tribe's
control over the expanding coal industry on the reservation.
These controlling factors are:
1. Management. Alternative coal development
enterprises, joint ventures on service
contracts.
2. Employment. Develop better training for
Navajo employees through affirmative action
programs.
3. Market Analysis. Reconsider the tribe's
ownership of a product in demand and rene-
gotiate coal leases to their advantage.
Because of the BIA's laxness, the Navajo Tribe has negotiated
mineral leases that were not to their advantage. Although
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there are established regulations stipulating minimum re-
quirements for leasing Indian minerals and land, federal
agencies have constantly ignored these regulations. To
date, the most successful challenge has been between the
Northern Cheyenne and the Department of the Interior.
Eventually, that tribe was able to get Secretary Morton to
rule in favor of the Tribe and they have decided not to
develop their coal resources. Perhaps the focus of this
issue is that the federal government tends to view Indian
land and mineral resources as public domain -- a resource
subject to the same policies as pertain to public lands --
rather than as private assets held in federal trust for
Indian individuals or tribal owners. To improve the Navajo
Tribe's control, it is recommended that they:
1. Establish a Tribal minerals contract office,
that would provide the expertise of negoti-
ating contracts to the best interest of the
Tribe, and coordinate both Tribal and federal
participation in the negotiative process.
2. Cancel or renegotiate existing leases.
3. Reevaluate alternative coal development
ventures:
a. Joint ventures, using the coal resources
that the Tribe owns as capital contribu-
tion.
b. Establish a Tribal enterprise through
service contracts.
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To date, coal gasification proposals have been rejected by
the Tribal Council, but in light of the present energy demand
and emphasis on synthetic fuels, these proposals most likely
will again be presented to the Council. It has been pro-
posed that at least six coal gasification plants be con-
structed in the Four Corners Region of the reservation, at
an approximate cost of $400 to 600 million and requiring
1,000 acres. With the Tribe's limited capital it would not
be possible to finance a venture of this magnitude. But
again, they should recognize their bargaining power, the
ownership of the coal resources and land that each plant
requires for construction.
Given the magnitude of the existing and proposed development
in the Four Corners Region, the resulting impacts will have
a long-lasting effect on the Navajo people. These impacts
fall under these categories: (1) water resources, (2) envi-
ronmental, and (3) new community development. The keystone
to all development will be determined by the amount of water
available. Already the San Juan River's (the main source of
surface water in the Four Corners Region) capacity is nearly
all allocated and most likely, as some suspect, overalloca-
ted. The Navajo's sovereign rights to water are constantly
being challenged or ignored by both federal and state
agencies. If this persists, any future Navajo projects
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requiring water will be left high and dry. It has been
reported that in areas of less than 10 inches of annual
rainfall, the land cannot be rehabilitated without supple-
mental irrigation. If the Tribe wants the strip-mined areas
reclaimed for future agriculture and livestock purposes,
then they need the water to correct the physical damage
this mining process has done to Navajo land. With the
potential for increased growth and development, there will
be an influx of immigration of people seeking employment.
This so-called boom development will create instant impacts
on both the socio-economic and socio-cultural life of the
reservation.
These impacts cannot be treated as separate entities within
the development process, because they are all interrelated
and have to be considered before any formal comprehensive
development policy is established by the Tribal decision-
makers.
To assist these decisionmakers, the following steps are
recommended:
1. Immediately expand the existing planning capa-
bilities within the tribal government organization.
This central planning office should have the
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skills to view more comprehensively the short-
and long-term planning objectives of the Tribal
Council; assist and advise these decisionmakers
on policy formulation, planning and evaluation;
examine opportunities for further definition,
strengthening and expansion of the principle of
self-determination; coordinate the planning and
implementation of other functions, such as housing,
transportation, hospitals, economic development,
recreation, etc.
2. Establish a Tribal Minerals Contract Office that
would provide the expertise in negotiating
mineral, oil, natural gas and uranium contracts,
and operate as the lead coordinator with other
federal agencies (BIA, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Geo-
logical Survey) and their participation in the
overall natural resource development process.
3. Establish coordination between the central plan-
ning office and minerals contract office to
improve overall communications, monitoring and
comprehensive planning within the tribal govern-
ment organization.
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CONCLUSION
The goal is to develop Navajo self-control through a process
of self-determination. Given the political and economic
pressures that persist from federal and state agencies and
private industry, can the Tribal Council as the principal
decisionmaking body establish a planning process that will
promote the overall welfare of the Navajo people without cen-
tralizing this decisionmaking process and becoming an elite
body, separate from the Navajo people?
Historically in this country the "Indian problem" has been
treated as a social problem. The gap between the Navajo
population and the rest of the country has been constantly
enforced over the years by maintaining the reservation,
through federal programs, as a place for fostering massive
does of social investment in remedial services intended to
promote acculturation and assimilation. This process was
encouraged by the BIA through its education and job place-
ment programs. Navajo children were sent to off-reservation
boarding schools and adults were sent to urban centers,
under the pretense that the job skills they train for would
enable them to join the mainstream of American society. To
date, most of these programs have failed, and the Navajo
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reservation has increased in size as well as in population.
In a 1970 unpublished BIA report, "Navajo Manpower Survey,"
it indicated that 72 percent of the Navajo labor force
wanted employment on the reservation. Why have these pro-
grams failed? There are several reasons, including a gross
underestimation of the strength of Navajo cultural differ-
ences, vast distance between the federal institutions and
the Navajo people, and just poor implementation. In addi-
tion, the federal government has disregarded the actual
realities of outmoded economic activities and Navajos have
been trained for a job market that did not exist on the
reservation. Moreover, the BIA focused on the social prob-
lem of the individual without examining the possible
economic causes or the dynamics of the economic system as
a whole.
Today, the emphasis has changed and the economic conditions
of Navajo life have received unprecedented attention, espe-
cially with the potential natural resource development.
This has shifted the focus from exporting Navajo labor to
urban areas to importing jobs to the reservation. This
has reinforced the Tribal Council's desire to promote self-
determination and the virtually unanimous desire of the
Navajo people to be able to provide for their economic
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needs rather than being obliged to move to distant, often
hostile, urban environments. With the past history of
federal domination over the development of the Navajo reser-
vation and society, the Navajos have proven that their cul-
ture cannot be as easily assimilated as presumed. On the
contrary, the challenge to the Tribal Council, with the
full cooperation of the federal government, is to construct
economics which can support Navajo life and preferences
rather than requiring their submission as a precondition for
prosperity.
The main question underlying the conduct of economic change
for the Navajo reservation is how to implement self-
determination. In other words, the question is how to build
a reservation economy which supports both individuals and
ways of life that are compatible with the reservation loca-
tion and whose indirect effects are not hostile to the
physical and social environment. This will require a devel-
opment process that can be controlled and managed by Navajo
people.
The Navajo Tribal Council has established reservation devel-
opment goals as indicated in their ten-year plan. As a
developing region, they should be exposed to alternative
strategies for implementing these goals. If they continue
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to rely on present conventional assumptions about human
resource development, employment structure, and numbers of
jobs, they will be forced into a substantial commitment to
external controls of the reservation economy. This, in
turn, introduces additional pressure for assimilation.
This process tends to promote a project-by-project orienta-
tion which obscures the Tribe's ability to coordinate a more
comprehensive development plan. Ultimately, the Tribal
Council may only inflict the social ills affecting the rest
of the country on the reservation in a more virulent form
than they have experienced in the past.
All is not lost. The Navajo Tribe still owns three prime
factors that maintain them as a tribal entity: (1) land,
(2) natural resources, and (3) water. To date, these ele-
ments have provided the Navajo Tribe, as well as other
Native American tribes, with a unique situation. Unlike any
other group of people, or corporate structure, the Navajos
have vast land holdings, 16 million acres, ample natural
resources, and their inherent right to water. The existence
of these factors have enabled the Navajos to retain their
society, culture, and identification as an Indian tribe.
But what about the future? The Navajo's coal wealth may
only be viable for the next 40 years, water resources may
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diminish, and portions of their land base may be eroded by
the process of strip mining. What will happen to the Navajo's
capital, human, and environmental investment? The
necessity to develop a more balanced growth strategy
throughout the reservation is imperative if the Tribal
Council's goal is to maintain control and pursue self-
determination. The strategy will only be implemented after
the planning capabilities of the tribe are redefined, ex-
panded and organized, and then integrated planning methods
will have to be developed that help the tribe in minimizing
their land and water resources while maximizing the human
resources, capital investment, and overall economic goals.
For example, in the Four Corners Region of the reservation
millions of acres of land are being strip mined. This land
will have to be reclaimed to its original condition. But
as stated in Chapter III, this will require supplemental
irrigation. At the same time, the Tribe has started a
massive irrigation project adjacent to the strip-mined area.
Also, the Tribe is being confronted with the prospect of
quantifying its future water needs in the area. It is th-
desire to have the mined lands reclaimed for the future
use to Navajo livestock owners. Thus, the Tribe could ex-
pand their agriculture venture into the stripped area. This
would meet three goals; the Tribe could (1) increase and
justify their future water needs by increasing the size of
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the irrigation project, (2) reclaim the strip-mined land,
and (3) use proper land management and reclamation techniques
to establish agriculture as a new economic base for the area,
replacing strip mining, over the next 40 years. Consequently,
(1) the land resource would be minimized as waste land and
maximized for agriculture purposes, (2) water rights would
be maximized by expanding the irrigation project, (3) eco-
nomic growth would be maximized by superimposing an agricul-
ture economic base over coal development, and (4) Navajo
employment opportunities would be maximized by sustaining
job opportunities, minimizing the necessity to leave the
reservation. This approach of integrated planning can be
accomplished once the Tribal Council realizes the potential
of the tribe's control over all resources.
If the Tribal Council goal is to achieve sustained self-
determination and self-sufficiency for their tribal
members within the context of Navajo culture, then the
Tribal Council will have to develop new planning strategies
and policies. These strategies should subordinate economic
goals to sociocultural goals and develop a transitional
period that will enable the Navajo people the opportunity
to develop more control and autonomy over their future and
in harmony with Navajo time.
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APPENDIX
CHACTERISTICS OF THE NAVAJO RESERVATION
Geographical Area
The Navajo Reservation is located in the Four Corners Region
of the Southwest United States and extends into the states of
Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico (see attached map). The reser-
vation encompasses approximately 25,000 square miles (16
million acres) and is larger than the combined areas of New
Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut -- thus making the
reservation the largest of all Indian reservations (compris-
ing one-fifth of all Indian land holdings).
Climate
Climate and soil productivity are largely dictated by ele-
vation and rainfall. Vegetative cover varies sharply from
sparse shrubs at the lower elevations (4,500 feet) to
forests in the mountainous regions (10,000 feet). The
reservation is comprised of high plateaus, deep canyons,
and low-lying plains and is transversed by a range of moun-
tains along the Arizona-New Mexico state line. Although
annual rainfall may be as high as 27 inches, in high alti-
dues, the climate is considered to be arid or semi-arid.
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Demographic and Economic
The most current data shows the Navajo population of the
reservation as approximately 142,000, with 6.2 persons per
square mile. The population growth rate is 3.4 percent/
year, and if this rate continues there will be nearly
300,000 Navajos on the reservation by the year 2000. There
are almost the same number of Navajo females as males living
on the reservation, with the median age of 16.3 for males
and 17.3 for females (see Table 1). Approximately 30 per-
cent of the population is under 20 years of age, which is 10
years younger than the median age of the U.S. population.
The average family size of the Navajo is 5.6 as compared
with the national average of 3.4
Income (Individual and Tribal)
The reservation has the lowest per capita income in the
United States. The Census of Population, 1970 showed
a per capita income of Navajos residing on the reservation
of only $900, compared with the national average of $3,900.
This means that the average person in the U.S. had almost
$3,000 more to spend on food, clothing and shelter than the
average Navajo. Correspondingly, 64.7 percent of the popu-
lation falls into the poverty class. It should be noted
that the relative amount of poverty on the reservation
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TABLE 1
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NAVAJO RESIDENT POPULATION
AGE
GROUP
60+
MALE
POP.
4 ,448
3,424
4,764
6,440
9,113
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9
Sub-Total
MALE
Percentage
of Total Pop.
FEMALE
Percentage
of Total Pop.
3.1 3.1 J
2. 4
3.3
4.5
6.4
2.6
4.0
5.4
7.5
FEMALE
POP.
4,466
3,703
5,671
7,798
10,638
18,975 16.3 13.3 14.1 17.3 20,121
21, 462 15. 1 15. 2 21, 638
68,626 Ma le
Median
Age
48.1% 51.9% Female
Median
Age
Source: Provisional Estimates, July 1, 1978; USORS, Base: 1970
Provided by: Information Services Department, The NAVAJO NATION
TOTAL
POP.
8,914
7, 127
10,435
14,238
19,751
39,096
43,100
74,035
142,6611T O T A L I 10%
varies with family size, composition and location. Usually
it is the rural families that have a larger family size,
lower annual income and because of their remote location
the highest incidence of poverty. Similarly, geographical
location and employment create a per capita income that
varies widely from the median of $900 ($398 at Rock Point
to $1,301 at Fort Defiance). The Navajo who resides in or
near an urban center has an average per capita income of
about $1,500. This is because the individual can be em-
ployed with the government and retail or manufacturing
businesses and the individual is usually employed full time.
In comparison, the Navajo who resides in the rural areas
of the reservation has a per capita income as low as $400.
This income is mostly derived from a pastoral economic base,
which iE both part time and seasonal employment.
In addition to the individual incomes, the Navajo tribe
receives additional revenue from federal subsidies and from
coal, oil, natural gas and uranium reserves. This income
diverts back into the general fund of the tribal government
and pays for the operation of the tribal government, welfare,
education, health, and social amenities (police and fire
departments, etc.). Also this income from natural resources
is invested in business ventures, both on and off the reser-
vation. Two enterprises that are tribally owned and on the
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reservation are a lumber mill and a utilities authority.
Both employ a substantial number of the Navajos and supply
a good financial return to the tribe.
Labor
Presently there is a potential labor force of slightly over
50,000 individuals on the reservation and of this figure
approximately 35,000 are employed full-time. As shown in
Table 2, the dominant employed laborers are those in the
traditional agricultural and traditional non-agricultural
sectors. The term traditional employment refers to raising
livestock and crops and weaving rugs or making jewelry. The
non-employed labor force on the reservation (Table 3) is
dominated by the unskilled labor market. Taking into con-
sideration the present labor force, it is interesting to
note that a high percentage of the unskilled and traditional
employed individuals reside in the remote areas of the reser-
vation. Consequently, they have a lower per capita income
and what income they do obtain is usually spent on food and
clothing with a small portion of the income being spent for
adequate housing.
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NAVAJO LABOR FORCE
OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED LABOR FORCE
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
TABLE 2
.4
NOT
REPORTED 12.3
UNSKI LLED
.: TF
* TI
Economic Opportunity
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NAVAJO LABOR FORCE
OCCUPATION OF NONEMPLOYED LABOR FORCE
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
TABLE 3
SEMISKILLED
PROFESSIONAL AND
MANAGERIAL A
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Labor Statistics
Total Male Female
Total under 16 years of age 68,295 33,788 34,557
Total 16 years and older 74,366 34,888 39,478
Not in Labor Force (16 and older) 23,200 9,699 13,501
Potential Labor Force (16 and older) 51,166 25,189 25,977
Employed 35,297 18,464 16,833
Not employed 15,869 6,725 9,144
Of the unemployed, those seeking
work 5,679 3,100 2,579
Unemployment Rate 31% 27% 35%
Governmental System
The Navajo reservation,as with other Indian reservations,
is composed of social and governmental subregions. In
1927, the Chapter system (Navajo grass roots political
subdivision), illustrated on the attached map, was initiated
as a means of organizing the people to cope with local
problems and issues. This system was used primarily by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs to administer its programs. Since
1950, Tribal funds have been used to construct Chapter
houses and local Chapter officers are elected by the local
community. The function of the Chapter officers is pri-
marily to represent the Chapters and serve as links between
the community service departments of the Tribal Council
and the people they represent. Today there are 102 Chapters
on the Navajo reservation.
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The Tribal Council is the central governing body and princi-
pal policy and decision-maker of the reservation. It is
composed of 87 councilmen elected every four years from com-
munities within the reservation. In addition to the council-
men, there is an elected chairman and vice-chairman who pre-
side over the Tribal Council. The reservation is divided
into five regions or agencies. These agencies are Tuba City,
Chinle, Fort Defiance, Shiprock, and Crownpoint. Within each
agency are located local offices for Navajo tribal and federal
administrative services, commercial activities, and industrial
and community services. (See the attached Tribal Organiza-
tion Chart and Area Agency Map.)
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THE NAVAJO TRIBE
ORGANIZATION CHART
FY 1978
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